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PART I
F
AN INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE
PHENOMENA UNDER STUDY
CHAPTER 1
An Introduction
s _
The subsequent dissertation represents an analysis of the impact of the
Federal Budgetary Cycle upon the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) Research and Development (R&D) budget
formulation process. The author's objectives may therefore be seen as the
following: (1) to analyze the Federal Budgetary Cycle; (2) to analyze N_C R&D
estimates and growth trends in relation to their implications on the Federal
Cycle; (3) to identify relevant problems; and_ (4) to recommend solutions
which display promise and feasibility.
Any research involving the Federal Budgetary Cycle can well be charac-
terized as of almost infinite scope and enormous complexity. For such r_'asons
one must meticulously delineate all operational parameters and thereafore main-
tain their integrity. To do otherwise is to invite intellectual dilution and
hazard a paltry effort.
Quite naturally then, the reader must understand various relationships
which generate implications regarding the basic substance and scope of this
study, before full appreciation for the dynamics of such an esoteric system
can be realized. To facilitate such discernment the ensuing must be discussed
as they ultimately relate to MSC: first 3 NASA's organizational evolution,
structure, and corresponding program responsibilities; second, the gender of
the appropriation under investigation compared with other NASA functional
appropriations; and, third, the explicit phases of the Federal Budgetary Cycle
coming under scrutiny. The remainder of this introductory chapter will be
2devoted to a treatment of these three areas in an admittedly cursory fashion.
The author's objective is to provide the reader with the familiarity necessary
to comprehend the parameters defining the scope of this treatise. Yet, over-
all coverage is not intended in any manner.
A Beginning
Ironically, the United States has frequently initiated steps toward estab-
lishing eminence in a given endeavor only after her stature in the field has
been admonished through world vicissitudes. With the outbreak of World War I,
the principal participating European nations by necessity advanced their aero-
nautical expertise to a level of undeniable superiority over that of America
in a relatively short period.
Due recognition of this fact lead to the establishment of the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) on l_arch 3, 1919o NACA was chacged
with the supervision and direction of scientific studies concerned with the
!
practical solution of the problems of flight.
Over the year's NACA's activities covered the spectrum of aeronautics re-
search and in its latter years of space research too. NACA's membership base
of individuals who served without compensation was drawn from "the military
and air services_ the Weather Bureau, the Smithsonian Institution, and the
,,_
scientific community.
Basically, the work of NACA centered around task orientated research and
the establishment of policy in the realm of aeronautical and space research.
INASA Historical Staff, Historical Sketch of NASA, (Washington, D.C.,
_9o5)_ p. i0
21bid. , p. !0.
Its contribution to America domination in the aircraft industry and our
national defense cannot be underestimated. 3
The primary theme being advancedhere is that NACArepresented an organi-
zatio_i which over its 43 year history was continually undergoing a positive
evolutionary process and thereby developed considerable maturity. By 19_8
NACAwas truly a dynamic, capable cadre of advisors, administrators, scien-
tists, and engineers who had achieved proficiency not onlyin their specific
functional areas, but also in effecting a rational integration of their in-
dividual efforts and relationships at the national level.
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 and NASA Organizatlon
The advent of Sputnik I brought a dramatic review and alteration of
American policy relating to aeronautics and space. The impressive Russian
feat was without question the primary stimulus in generating the National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. The language of this act called for the
creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration whose paramount
objectives were to be:
II) Developing aeronautical and space vehicles;
(2) Studying the space environment by scientific instruments of many
types;
(3) Beginning the exploration of space and the solar system by man
himself;
(4) Applying space science and technology to the development of earth
satellites for peaceful purposes to promote human welfare; and,
15) Applying space science and technology in supportof military put-
4
poses of national defense and welfare.
On October i, 1958, the date NASA became officially operational, approxi-
mately 8000 NACApersonnel and their research facilities were transferrel to
j_
_Ibid., p. i0.
LI'NASA's Basic Management Struct_n_e and Conceots," ._eadquarters Management
Seminar, Unit !, (Washington, D.C., September 1965)_ p. _.
NASA. However, the provisions set forth in the SpaceAct obviously demanded
a substantially increased role of government in aeronautical and space pro-
grams. The magnitude and rate of NASA'stotal program growth may emphatically
be shownfrom inspection of tables i.i, 1.2, and 1.3. Special note should be
madeof the "rates of growth" between civilian personnel and appropriations
(table 1.3) over the years. This reveals one of the basic concepts of the
NASAprogram- namely, its mounting dependenceon American private industry
to contract for and produce space program hardware (over 90 percent of NASA's
annual budget is now accounted for in this way).
Table I. i
PERSORT_L GRO_fH
Scientists and
Engineers 3,194 3,515 5,767 8,161 10,978 12,427 13,304 17,050"
Administrative
(Professional) 550 700 943 1,834 2,811 3,421 3,783 3,_I_ _
Technicians,
Clerical and
Wage Board 5,491 6.,017 10,763 13,691 16,1_5 16,651 16,657
Total Civilian 9,235 10,232 17,471 23,686 29,934 32,499 33,744
Military _8 64 89 139 210 250 2_2
13,640"
34,100
250*
*Assumes same ratio among civilian and same number of military as in !965
merely to arrive at an order of magnitude estimate in table I.i.
-F
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Table i.2
INCRE%SES IN APPROPRLiT!ONS _ OBLIGATIONS FJD DISBURS_,_BYIS _x_
_iscal Year
(Millions of dollars )
_9_0 196A _.9j..._2 _ _ :19__ _t. !9_6
Appropriations _331 _524 _964 _1,825 ._3,674 _5,100 _5,250" $5,175
Obligations 299 494 923 1,692 3,4_ 4,86_ _,_00 5,!00
Disbursements 145 401 744 13257 2,552 4,171 5,100 5,600
*Includes supplemental appropriation of _72.5 applied to fiscal year 1964 •
authorization.
_X_Explicit meaning of these terms explained later in this chapter.
Table 1,3
IhiTES OF GROWTH
IN PERSOhBYEL _tND APPROPRIATIONS
(FY 1959 = I00)
Civilian Personnel ll! 159 256 324 352 365 369
Appropriations 158 291 551 Z,ll0 1,_41 1,586 1,568
\,
Yet, one must be cognizant of more than simply the gross impact thls act
had on NASA's growth in terms of personnel and monies, Ge_erallsr speakirN the
Space Act established the overall NASA program framework wh_le expressing
essential authorities and responsibilities the agency holds'; Fortunately, it
did leave the arena of exact program content, formulation, and executlon up to
the discretion of NASA management. 5
5"_ne PlanninE s_ud Approval Process," Headquarters Management Seminar,
Unit 2, (Washington, D.C., December 1965), p. 4"_ - -
Obviously, in any organization which has experienced the tremendousgrowth
rate characteristic of NASAsince 1958, frequent organizational changesare not
_usual, but rather, often essential if the organizations rapidly expanding
programs are to be managedwell. While such a phenomenonhas occurred within
NASA,the author will discuss only the existing organizational structure
germaneto the topic under study.
Figure !.I depicts NASA'stotal organizational structure. The rationale
behind this method of organization is inherently related to the basic concepts
NASA management advocates for efficiently achievinc its primary objectives.
More specifically, _ASA is structured so that the following management con-
cepts can be practiced: (!) maximum decentralization; (2) free flow of infor-
mation; (3) min£mum approval and review; and, (4) maximum local option in
6
selecting administrative procedures and methods.
As shown in figure i.i, NASA's ultimate manazers are the Administrator,
the Deputy Administrator, and the Associate Deputy Administrator, respectively.
The Administrator may be epitomized as a source of policy formulation at the
agency and national levels. Moreover, he devotes his attention to external
relationships of critical importance to NASA such as those with the President,
Budget Bureau, Congress, and the public. The Deputy Administrator carries out
identical functions, particularly so in the Administrator's absence, and ex-
tends special attention to agency policy as affected by its tecbmlcal and
scientific interests. Neither of these individuals will typically be con-
cerned with _ASA's daily operations, as this responsibility is under the
Associate Deputy Administrator's bailiwick. He may be looked upon as the
_.ASA s Basic Management Structure and Concepts, op. tit., pp. _-_._.
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"general manager" of the agency and is thereby responsible for the maintenance
7
of agency-wide program integration, balance, and flexibility.
Directly under the Associate Deputy Administrator are: (i) Office of
Manned Space Flight (OY_F); (2) Office of Space Science and Applications
(OSSA); and, (3) Office of Advanced Research and Technology (0ART) - eae__his
under the guidance of an Associate A_ninistrator. These offices are responsi-
ble for principal areas of NASA's total program and each major field installa-
tion reports to one of these th_'ee offices. _ch office assumes both program
and institutional management over the installations within their jurisdiction.
1
This _lig_ment is advantageous in that it relieves the Associate Deputy Admin-
istrator (general manager) of numerous everyday tasks so that he has the free-
8
dom to examine policy and overa!] management raatters.
The institutional focal point of this analysis, the Manned Spacecraft
Center (_C), lies within OMSF as portrayed in figure 1.2. The major program
responskbiiities of OMSF specifically relate to manned spaceflight and cur-
rently consist of three programs: (!) Gemini; (2) Apollo; and (3) Advanced
Missions. Under the fiscal year 1966 appropriations bill the former were only
three of the twenty-three R&D programs receiving appropriated monies within
.TNASA,however they accounted for approximately 71 percent of NASA's R&D total
appropriation.
MSC holds assignments in all three of the manned space flight programs,
althouch by far (in terms of dollars and manpower) Apollo is the largest with
Gemini second and Advanced _Assions a distant third. Figure 1.2 indicates that
__oid., p. i!.
$!bid., p. Ii.
regardless of the program at hand_MSCis charged with three primar/ respon-
sibilities: (i) the development of spacecraft and related equipment for manned
spaceflight programs; (2) the selection and trainimg of flight crews; and,
(3) the conduct of mannedflight operations. 9 MSC'sI_D budget in fiscal
year (FY) 1966 will be around 45 perce:_t of the _FI_D budget and 32 per-
cent of the complete _SA P_D_oudget. Therefore_ it seemsrather self-evident
that MSChas been delegated the respo_siblity for momentousinputs into the
_ASA_&Deffort. Assumingthere has been sufficiemt assimilation by the reader
of MSC'sorganizational position, role, and the magnitude of its gross P_D
effort_, the author will now discuss addition_l parameters which must be
elucidated before the fundamental analysis maybe_in.
Approoriations Classification
The basic thrust of this p_per e_tends toward an analysis of phenomena
inherently caused by, derivable from, or attributable to the budget formula-
tion of MSC Research and D_velopment programs. ]_owever, while l%_D receives
singular examination, one should realize tha_ this appropriation does not
denote the MSC budget in its entirety. The total MSC budget is derived only
after the inclusion of the Administrative Operations (A0) and the Construction
of Facilities (C of F) appropriations with that of the R&D function.
Research and Development appropriations are used in functional activities
implied by their name, and in FY 1966 represented 87.5 percent of NASA funds
appropriated. These funds are structured on a Program/Project basis and may
be used to incur obligations until totally obligated and are thereby termed
.._nnea_ _oa:eeraft Center," Bud_:_Z Eot:_at_ _- F_scal Year 196_ -:d_nne_
_.ce _ht_ _o_rams, Volume \', (Was:!:i_gton, D.C., October !96_), ._- ._.0,-!_
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"no year" money. Apportionment by the Budget Bureau is on a "bulk" basis with
a reserve retained by BOB. Funding to MSC from NASA Headquarters is by allot-
ment on an incremental basis.
Similar to P_D appropriations, are those for Construction of Facilities
which fund major construction and/or modiflcation_ minor construction, and
design engineering. These appropriations are structured on a location/project
basis and are included under the "continuing activity" class which enables MSC
to carry them from one year to the next until these funds a_e totally obligated.
The Budget Bureau also apportions C of F monies of a "bulk wlthreserve" basis,
however MSC receives authority to obligate them in a single allotment.
Congress displays a vital interest in this class of appropriations as
they approve all specific projects individually and thereby remove most cf
the flexibility these programs might have. Traditionally C of F appropriations
have possessed less lee-way than any other type. Thusly, long range program-
ming is of the utmost importance in this function.
The final appropriation class found in i\<SA's budget is that for Adminis-
trative Operations. The pay of persormel, travel and transportation of persons,
and all other administrative operations are funded from AO. This appropriation
differs from R&D and C of F appropriations in that it is annual - therefore
any funds not obligated by the end of the FY for which they were appropriated
are wholly lost. AO funds are of the center/object class structure and are
apportioned by the Budget Bureau on a quarterly basis. In turn, NASA Head-
quarters allots these funds according to the "level-of-effort" being partaken
at !_C.
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Terminology - Concepts
The discussion advanced thus far _ms touched upon numerous facts and
terms. Undoubtedly, many of these will become clearer and hOld n_Dre meaning
for the reader as the paper progresses. A much more explicit _u_.derstanding
of the RID function should develop and hopefully the "big picture" will appear.
However, it is essential that several key terms and concepts be unequivo-
cally differentiated before conLinuing on. This may be viewed asa further
refinement of the parameters setting the context of this work and shou_l_ there-
J
fore not be taken too lightly. The terms to be discussed are _ no mean6 com-
_j
prehensive in _heir coverage of the topic under examlnation_ but rather are
representative of crug!al concepts associated with the primary elements of
this study and will be considered in the chronological order they assuz%e in a
!
typical budgetary cycle.
Before any of the appropriations formerly mentioned ca_ ever be cohsidered
by Congress, there must be a bill providing for the authorlzation of the given
appropriation. Congressional authorization bills generate the legal authority
for the appropriations committees to appropriate monies _p _o, b_t never over,
a specifically stated ceiling. Quite often the actual amount appropriated is
less than what was authorized to be appropriated.
An appropriation bill, once signed into law by the President, represents
the quantity of new obligational authority (NOA) assigned _ a given agency
for the relevant FY. In other words, this amount represent_s to what degree
the agency may incur new obligations over and above whatlt previously had the
authority to incur. Moreover, it is a legal guarantee that these additional
obligations will be honored by the U.S. Treastu_y through payment. One shoul_
recognize t?_t I_OA may not unifo_n!y be equated in any given FY with an
13
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agencies' total obligations incurred or dispersements made, especially when
their programs include s_ostantial P_D or construction efforts as in the case
with _SA. This point will be reinterated later in the chapter and schemati-
cally depicted.
However, even after the President signs NASA's appropriation bill, there
remains one more step which must be met before NA2Z receives its duly processed
N0A - namely, apportio_e_it by the Bur_uu oi!'the _udget. Functionally, the
apportionment process represents a transfer or release of NOA to 'NASA by the
President. As mentioned earlier, this can take on several forms depending upon
the class of the appropriation.
Following the apportionment process_ NASA He_dquarters _ill allot monies
or NOA to field installations pursuant to their Program Operating Plans
(POP). I0 The allotment process is simply another of the several major institu-
tional control mechanisms employed to distribute NOA. Without iegimate allot-
ments, new programs cannot be initiated or existing programs maintained. As
related previously, the procedural mechanics of this process vary according to
the nature of the appropriations.
Upon receiving an allotment for NOA, _C can then legally incur _-
tions - bilateral, legally binding com.mitments between _v_C and various con-
tractors - within the designated ceiling figure of the Headquarters allotment.
In doing so, Y_C will usually contract industry to provide hardware, services,
or other entities at a specified future date which are necessary in accomplish-
ing _._C's ultimate program objectives.
,_ee cha_ter_ _.
,_or obvious reasons, _'._Cdeems iv udvizable to check, measure, and analyze
the progress of these contracts which their obligated monies are to f_nd. One
of the principal means for doing so is the use of accrued cost. This concept
represents the technique in which for a given contract the "use_ application
or consumption of human and material resources expressed in dollars terms,
(is) reported in the period of time when occurring (rather than when the item
is delivered or billed). ''ll
Finally, when _,_SC is bil_ed for commodities provided in full accordance
with the stipulations of a given contr_ct, it must honor its contractural
obligations and thusly inc_ disbursements. With the exception of post-_;udit
and other reviewing processes, one may visualize disbursements as marking the.
end of the budget cycle.
Frequently, the general pt_lic is confused by the r_latlonshlps of the
latter three budget terms under discussion: obligations; accrued cost; and, .
disbtn-sements - particularly as they coneer_ agency or government budgeting.
Figure 1.3 characterizes this interaction as it typically would be for one of
_C's major R&D programs. This diagram should by no means be construed as
relating explicit phenomena for differing classes of appropriations or for
dissimilar agencies (although approximations and likenesses definitely exist).
Figure 1.3 shows N0A appropriated for a ikypothetical FY which by T9 will
equate obligations (0B), accrued cost (AC)_ and disbursements (D) to the cumu-
lative dollar total of CD 5. Whlle the author's concern in this paper is with
Zhe phenomena governing R&D budget formulation of N0A for a given year_ it
will be advantageous for the reader to understand how accrued cost and dis-
Lar_ements of appropriated NOA relate to the incurrence of obligatio_s. TT_e
±±"Ludget Formulation and Ezecutio:_," _7!e:_dqus'rters_nagement Seminr_r,
Unit _, (Washington, D.C., September 1965), p. 6b.
"I _ _ _ "
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graph does not portray the incurrence of 0B, AC, or D from N0A appropriations
gained in years prior to or after the hypothetical FY under examination. Under
this case the author is assuming that Congress has enacted, the President
approved, the Budget Bureau apportioned, and NASA Headquarters alloted the NOA
under scrutiny.
First consider point CD0 which represents the initial realization of
either 0B, AC, or D. We see th._t at CD0, TO < T1 < T2, or at CD1, T 3 < T4 < TS,
which simply means for a finite cumulative dollar level AC lags 0B and D lags
AC in the time dimension. Thusly at a discrete time, such as T6, one sees
D6 = CD2 < AC 6 = CD_ < OB_ = CD .
Another factor worthy of m_ntion is that not all RLD NOA is fully in-
curred in a single FY for either 0B, AC, or D, but t.hat it may be carried
on in¢o the ensuing FY- this does occur infrequently though. For example,
at T6 (which we shall consider the end of our hypothetical FY) one sees the
following remainders: OB_o = CD_D - CD4; AC 6 = CD 5 - CD3; and, D6 _ CD5 - CD2.
These amounts must be incurred before being equal to NOA appropriated for ehe
hypothetical FY.
A¢T 8 we find CD5 = OB 8 = AC 8 > D8 as the contractors have now libeled
themselves for an amount equal to what NASA is legally obligated. Finally at
one discovers CD5 = 0B 9 = AC 9 = D9 and the monies appropriated have been
_9
obligated by NASA, associated cost accrued by the contractor, and the subse-
quent disbursements effected in full.
The Federal Budgetary C_ycle -An Admonition
_ the reader will learn in more detail later, there are four _}u.ses to
th._ 3_d_ra! 3udgeta_j ©jcle: (I) _xecutive Preparations and Submission;
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(2) Congressional Authorization and Appropriation; (3) _:ecution; and,
(4) Audit. _£hile elementary coverage will be afforded all Of them_ the
author's principal conccl'n gravitates to the initial two phases.
Furthermore, these two p_ses will be delved into in depth only in matters
of major significance to the RiD budget fo_nulation process. It is hoped
that such a methodology will enable a sufficiently pe_etratlng analysis of
the problems at hand.
/
f
i
L_
Background of the Problem
t_ne chapter will attempt -to portray in _ realistic, operational context,
the background central to the problem ur_der ana!y_is in this disserzation.
%_nerefore, the aut?.or will initially p2ovidc a description of the Federal
Budgetary ©/cie and subsequently scruti__ize -'he p_ob!ems unique to the
R&D programs. The inclusion of the Federal L c.d_eta1_arC_/cle at this point
has been effec_ed to better facilitate _e reader's understanding of how this
Cycle imposes substantive constr_ints upon the R&D programs at the _&_ed
Sp._cecraft Center. However, ti._ treatment i._.'this c.hapter directed at the
Cycle will be decidedly c_L_sory, as a _.bstancially more penetrating examina-
tion thereof will be provided i_ chapter 3-
The Federal Budgetary Cycle.
Since the formulation of t_:!_Constitution of the United States in I_8_,
the Congress of the United States has Leld the due authority to authorize and
appropriate monies of the United States Treas_ry. The procedural mechanics
governi_ig th_s process and "their underlying r_tionale have been slowly evolv-
ing since Zhe inception of the process to accommodate the demands of our
dyne_nJc, kaleidoscopic democracy.
_.._hiletLe United States is admittedly the richest, most powerful co_.c.v_
in the histo_/ of civilization, it also possesses a limited _nount of resources,
or dollars if you will, with which it can strive to satiate its desires, wants,
_'_d _.._eds. This applies to all entities; rich and poor, large or :_:::iI-
.i.::cl,r,!_:._ th,_ Gover_-_en_ of the Unlted States of /,met!ca. Accordi,. _,,_-;., :-.c._-
t?....._I.C'._of' _Le Art:Lc!es of Cor,federatfon, the U_v.:_tedStates C_ver,.:'-_.:_t?:_
?9
ascertained the necessity of employing its ±_csourc_sin a prudent fashion.
This is mademore lucid upon ez_._ining the words of Professor Jesse Bumkhead:
Goverrmlentbudgeting is or._cof the major processes by which the
i
use of public reso_rces is p__.ann_dand controlled; and a budget
system is synor;ymouswith _ c!arii'ication of responsibility in
goverr_ent, whether the ra_-_geof goverPm_.enta]programs is broad
2
or narrow.
Thus, one sees a proc_-s_ _parsua_r_ to allocating all resources controlled
by the Federal Governme_ in a:: efficient a m._nr:er as possible. The process
to which reference i_as be_. made. is, _.'_lely: the lbderal B_dgetary _gcle. It
may be deemed one oi' the primaz-y caus_zl factors f:'o'.,_which many of the I__SA/
_._oCbudget formulation problems are derived.
This chapter will yi_!d a brief description of the Federal Budgetary
Cycle as it pusses throuc_,_,its four pri_oipal phases: \__) Executive Prep:_ra-
tion and Submission; (2) Legislative A_rghorization and Appropriation;
(5) _b:ecution; and, (4) Audit. Specifically, the _cle will be traced from
k_ as _he foc_l point.inception to completion using ' '_
2_verai _rords of caution are due aZ this stage, For the p_rpose of
chapter 2 is essentially to provide an overall view of the Cycle and some of
its ir.herent c_haracteristics so that correlations between it and I%{D problems
can be inductively realized by the reader after his completion of Pa__t I.
__is backgro_omd is J:nperative if the chapters of Parts ii and Iii are to
achieve their full impact. The author also believes it wo"_id be gainfu_l for
the reader to keep these and the introductory remarks advanced by _he auvhor
oesse Burkhead, Government Budgetin@, (5Jew York, 1956), p. vii.
-i_oid., p. 29.
f-
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_n mind as the subsequent chapter's unfold. Such an approach will undoubtedly
aid the reader in perceiving explicitly the scopt of the study and its intrinsic
objectives.
_ne time required for the completion of all activities for a _iven fiscal
year (EY) in the Federal Budgetary Cycle may well _pproach %hree years or more
if advanced asency planning and _xter_._l audi% f_p,ctions are considered. Ko_¢-
ever, the Cycle is ....._ua_]y char_:_erJ,._, _ as requiri_:g approximately 30 months
for completion. Therefore, it fs not <_com'_,_o_to discover agencies substan-
tially involved in various ph;_:_.s of %,< Cycle for three different fiscal years
at any one given time.
Figure 2. ! rep='cse<_s sch_m_r_icai!_, how _he Federal Budgetary C_/cle oper-
ates to provide the resources essential in accomplishing the ultimate program
objectives of Y_$C. it is vital that the reader _ders_and this overall pro-
cess - especially the time and schedule relationships which will portend
crucial phenomena t}'_o_hout this paper'.
The Federal Budgetary Cy_.l_ is formally acti',,.c_tedin March or approxi-
mately 16 months b_fore the com::_ncement of the b<dget year as the Bureau of
the _cdset (EOB) issues a call for preliminary esi_Zmates (Step i). Corre-
spondh<'ly, HZC would receive the same call as it is transmitted (Step 2_
down from NASA Headquarters (NASA/HQ). MSC management has been generati:'.S
preliminary budget data since early January, and it then submits its pre-
liminary estimates to NASA/HQ !'oi"review and consolidation into the overall
agency preliminary estimates which are then forwarded to BOB (Step _).
Cen_.r,'_lly speakinc, the preliminary estimates pertain to broad progr_as and
!_=ck .:_uchdctui!.
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Following a_alysis at the i°residcntial level of the Adrainistration_ EOB
will direct to NASA/HQ (usL_lly _n J{lly or ii months in advance of the budget
year) a policy letter delineatin C fo_t, scope, aud guidelines to be adhered
to while computing the substant!v_!y more determinate final budget est£mates
(Step 5b). K:.%_%/EQ the._lrelays this inform_tlon along with its own qu_i._y-
in_ and restricting budget criteria to _C (S_ep 4). Once again, _.93Csupplies
th,_ requested budset data to II4_5A/HQ (Step 5), although considerably more
justification and backup d_:ta (_o_m t_ the %,stem_ level -see chapter 4) are
incorporated into this su_missio_:. The final _ge_,.cy estimates are then pre-
" " (Step 6: ,_ _- "sented _o BOB in th_ end of Se_._mber 9 ..on n_ before the budget
year begins), aftor a rele.._tless review, coz:solid&tion, adjustment, and analy-
sis process om zinc o_rt of ......_._n_/_7_._management to ensure the achievement of
program baia_ce a_d integrity.
Subsequently in October, B0B holds hearings and other review actions on
the fir:_i _._r!\S^_:budget estimates, consolidates and imeoroorates them along with
-,_" 4°e_,_mu_:s from most other gover:m-ent agencies into the Prea_dent's budget, and
finally transmits the Complete budget package with specific recommendations to
the President (Step 7). Throughout this period, BOB informs agencies of
alterations in their finals estimates and transmits appeals regarding such
changes to the President. 'After these proceedings are finalized, BOB will be
responsible for drafting the Presidents budget message in November, December,
and early January.
_Coical!y, the President will present his budget to a joint session of
Congress in the latter half of Janua_g (Step _). All actions involved up to
_:._."ooint renrese_.t, the fxrs_ _o>':_°e---_o:.'the Federal ou_oeta_y _'cle, .,'._,,,_.. ..._ : '_,
that _,f thv __,.ecutive P._eparation and Stbmission.
F"
The _rcle's next sequential even_ occurs when the rI:qSAauthorizatlo_-. _ bill
comes before the 7-ouse Colmllitte_=on Science and Astronautics for action in
Februa_,. Subseq--_ently the Sen:_e Co J:_ittee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences
will initiate proceedings for t!_- }SkS:Aautho_izatlo_,, bill and followin_ pas-
sage in both Houses of Co::gress :_he C_Zere.uc_ Committee will meet to resolve
any existing differences in the, 0_;_oL.!lis (Si_cps 9 thro'_Zh II)o Huving done
this under the approval of bo0_, Lhe Louse aad Senate, t.he bill will go to the
i>resident for signature i_-,to]a_ - t:<,:_swill often occuz" as late as _y
(Step 12).
The last major effort in this pk_=s_.,of the c2,:le is the appropriation of
funds. The proced _L'_ adh_,red to is _,u-h the same _s in the authorization, pro-
cess (Steps !5 thro.gh mp_ _,!-_ the e:<ucption tb_b _he Lills are taken up in
the Imdepemd_!.,t Cffices Subco_,m_ittee ....:der the Co._:.':_itt_-,_:on Appropriations,
The exact natare of this process _iil Jc given co_.s!derably more d_.+_ail in
• , - i _._.yand Ju_ue.chapter _. q_q_eapproporation p:._.se_,.,.i__ zdea=ly occu__ _..
h'C-o_.fL!iy, the _-.,:_ _i:.pro_:r_._o_ %ill ].as been passed in the Y.ouse and
Senate aad expeditio_s!y signed cy th= President l cfore July ist (Step 16),
_b_#ev_, the interactio_ of _<yriad societal, political, and strategic vicis-
situdes will frequently overload Cot_cress to the extent _,,'heresome anp-'-opria-
_ion L ills arc not resolved by <_c beginning of the budget year (July i).
_h-_the advent of such an occurance_ Co._ress _l!ows the affected agency
_o o_er_te under a condition ol....Continuing Resolution" which essentially
.,',=or_:_;_:vtsg_-e trarsmittal to said agency of program and obli_ational authority
_.- _:: .:_isked pro_r_ms at a :'_ze comm_.,_sura_e %o ":he Drior year_s _v,,,.or,rla-
'_,_:: ..<_.i. 'Yl,.isin_erlm act constitutes a portio:_ of the au'_horiz_-o,: .r..d
a:,_='or.:ution ph&s,_ of s::, l,_edcru! Buddetar$," Cjele whenever iL is :.....- _mcrted.
f--
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The Execution process repl',.:::cntsthe next phu.se of the 6_jc!e. Initial
action here begins with NASA/KQ requesting apport.iop_ent of their appropriated
_ev_e,,_ud budget needs in light off_nds from 30B after top NASA m,'_u':agementhas _ ....
the NASA appropriations _,Taz,rantwhich is ge_nerated by the Treasury Department.
Step .!5a relates this deed whic_i-_must be accompll:d:ed by ._y 21 or within
15 days from the approval of tL:. ZASA _ppropria_io.-_s ac_, whichever is ia_er.
.__L.___'.....se f"u_d3 ap.d th_:_..Ssyadvance new ob!igatiomalSimilarly, BOB must appo " '_'
auti_ority (Step o_i ) to x_ _i.._,_ ,_z_e i0 or _9 days ai'_er approval of _he appro-
priations act, _.T}-iche*_er is i.-..,_....
Upon gaini_k_ _ppor_ioued l":kds, NASA/HQ-0hen _,.!lotz to Y_C oblisatlona!
authority in line with pro,.-_r_rm_<:glevels for the fisca! yeal- (Step 19). Thls_
together with the program autho,:ity H£ !_as given _.:SC,allows the Center ,to
embari: on explicit progr_ orie:-:t_cged actions necessary to realize the HSC in-
puts into I%:_SA's integrated, ov_.ral! _2fort.
J
T'L_sly; the I_.SA/MSC Pederul Budgetary C_cle ::chematic sho_zs activlties
such as ordering goods and ser\.ices (Step 20), receipt of :)Ills from the sup-
pliers and contractors providin S such commodities _Step 2i)._ _:SC requesting
for t_ue_-payment, of t_.ese'_bills by the Treasury Depart_nent (i_tep 22), _.d finally
"c?e treasu/_g's pa_nent of gi_e relevs/_ bills (Step 2_).
The last stage in the Cycle concerns a__dit s_4pervision. This du-_y is the
responsibility of the General Accounting Office which reports to .the Coz_..ittees
.7
om Government Operations in the House and Senate. Although being charac .erized
_s the last phase, audit operations can and do occ'_r throughout any given fis-
cal year and may be either comprehensive or general in nature when applied to
\
t\
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T_ese proceedings are primarily toe,dueted to cheek and ensure t;-e integ-
rity of _C reporting, acco_ting, and other operuting proced_res. If GAO
d_scovers incorrect or illegal _;_e o_' age_ey fLunds and/or other resources,
remedial measures will be so_uz}_ in addJtiot_ to a possible report to Oor_gress
if t]._ offense is serious enough-.
_,fr.athen are a few of ti!_._major charac4_ristits displayed by the _ederal
Budgeta_y C_c!e? _C!at are 6b.w _oi_'inc_cai cci_rai;_ts the reader might well
remember while p_'suing c_apte_-. " and Luildi_g k_ow]_edg_ably a firm base upon
which a thorough u_tderstamding of the problems at _;_nd can be analyzed
_ rationally?
First, the Cycle is a formalistic-!egalistic mechanism which has come to
rely heavily upon a traditional and u_-_ifo_: methodology that is often sub-
servient to the pol!tic:.dt envi__;_;_nent. Y_i_.dt_ou_ - this does not necessarily
imply damnln_-S evil _-_d moreov_ the >,_ed f'o_'the _%_cle's elimination, b_t
rather that i% can readily impo_;c, inh_oitis_e effe_.ts upon gover_ment agencies
whose mission involves su]_stantlal adva._ced }t&D efforts.
£econdly, the Cycle demands the abilit3_ (of agencies) to schedule a/_& pre-
dict •.._ithreasonable accuracy t}_e total amount of resources needed to meet
(_gew_'y) ultimate seals and objectives for a given fiscal year long before
they are to be needc_d, This as _e shall see_ can prove to %e a most difficult
task,
t_Xese t_o ph_omena _.._illbe developed extensively in later chapters, It
will .;uffioe for .uo_.._to say thavt they are crucial factors to which some tt_e
of r_._o_lut;_on :is necessary,
f_
_6
Probi_m:_ in Research and _evelooment
Generally speaking most Research and Development activities have been
ur_ivers=lly characterized as L_!_redictable a_ complex, i_o_ever_ _his state-
ment is a wholly ina.dequat_ description of the P_D function - particularly so 3
when one restricts his attentio_ to the major R&D programs being a_ministered
by agencies sucl_ as the Atomic iL_uergy C_mm.ission, the Department of Defense,
and the National Aeronauti,.-s and Space, hdmim-_ration.
Before a genuine appreciation for the proble:_ under attack can be de-
veloped, one must realize uxy,!_cit!y the muni_ne _rJb!ems _itomizing the
P_D efforts. Therefore, the autkor w_il use _he r_malnder ©f this chapter as
a vehicle for investiga-_ng the dile.m:_u _iq_c to aerospace programs in general
and to S_ASA's .'_:_='._dSpacecraft Center in particular.
_ati o_a! Priorit_
It is, perhaps, amazing to discovez" that most R&D progrs.m difficulties
under s_udy in this paper orlgin_te because of the relatively lofty priority
they have been assigned by most U.S, citizens, th_ Federal Government, _nd
many citizens and countries of the Free World for that matter. Logically
then one might ask, "Ho_ is it that the space effort has come _o enjoy the
_yielding co:mm_itment and support of the United States of America?" Upon
establishing cognizance regarding K<a_SA's high priority, one is better able to
comprehend the dyn_nic processes involved and the volatile milieu with£n which
they function,
@_. October h, 1957, the U,S.S.R. !a_nched an earth satellite appr_xhmat-
-:L_ four tons w..mcn remained _n orbit arou_.d 90 days. In doing so, the Soviets
9ce_._c_:iarly usurped the United States into a sD_ce race which exh._-bi_s
k
.f-
>.o_r_c_8 of' conti_iui_ o_ for _"_rsj if iiot for (iccades a:26[centurle_ to come.
in the _*ords of _k_ene :_:e_-__ a _J_SA h_stori_n, this feat- ....
".. ,greatly _codded man's _cienti?ie eo;.quest of space and ani-
mated a c2_i2, 2-eaetio.u of "_ .....
_._seq,_,=_ ew.nts which has not y_t
expired. One of _ •2_ i_._u_'udb=cte e_._sequ_._nces wms BY:_ creat_o_ of
._=am_.=_str(__on by Octoberthe National Aeronautics _ud Spac_ _.... ._".....
!958..5
A_y objective analysis of the h__2"_._ prioritT _:_'=.,_.6,_ possesses along with a
ratioua!ization of that organizations near astronomical R&D fund gro_,rth must
consider _-" , iniv_ factors the followin2 orde.c of importance: (!) mi!it_z_/
supremacy; (2) the pledge of two Presidunts; (3) _.,m's insmtiab!e propen._ity
to conquer the unknownj (4) propaganda opporttciitiesj and (_) technological
spillover. All of these are fu:id'-amental requisites for the strategic well-
being of the United States and :iatura!l_- assist i:_ de_erminzing societal
priorities.
_,2r_t, there a convinci_._S nexus between the goals and objectives of
f.,V_SAand the military s_premacy of the United States. Admitted!y, when
President Eisenhower signed the act creating the 2%ationa! Aeronautics _n_.
Space A_ainistz'ation on July °9-: 1958, the l_ngua_ie therein stated ex_re_:_edly:
5!7_a%it is the policy of the United States that activities in
space should oe devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit
4
of all mankind.
_cg.en,_ M, P._zne,Aeronautics and Astronautie_: A_u _zner:fcan Chror.o!:_C.r of
D.C., iggi), p. 89."
],
.!_sia., p. i00.
p-
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Yet, in a s_cech o:, f_Z_'c cecu_':l_y in !957, Presiden_ Eisenhower had ex-
pounded candidly:
If _he project is desig.ue_ solei_ :or _,:_.._nti,fie purposes, its
size ai_d cos_ must ]>_ _cai!o_ed _co _'_e sc__nti_:i_c job it is going
to do. If t]-:eprojec:_ 2,_:',uome 2 .imat_ def_:_::a value, its ur-
gency for this pvrDosc i_ to be j,_dged iT: co:_:parison with the
probable va_u_ of compet.i_ C def'_msc projects. 5 _
_T:_ key word i_. this quote _s "La'_jency," for irregard_ss of ;Then ,man
ultime._,ly lands on the moon -bh_ cost will be substantial. Few will repudiate
the fac_ that the _m_eriQ'an spuce prog_'am reflects a note of urgency, and ac-
cordingly rates a :-_ighnat_o::a! priority.
_c_ ame that t[:e Unit_.d States is pursuing a peaceful exolora-
tioz_ of ouver _pace on the whole. Hc_.._ever_once we realize the capabi!_Ity to
efi'ec_i_ely attain, llve, cud work iu such a hostile environment, it _._illbe
relatively facile to engineer military _pplications to our peacefully begotten
knowledge and swi_'tly achieve _r_mendo_s strategic milltary_ eminence. _.e
aut_.o_' finds it mos_ difficult _o arg_c that our present involvement in' space
,_ould ass_ne its ex_sti_. G scopt :if derivative military applications were not
/'_as i ,:,le.
_]ecor_d, the pledge to land a mar, o.u the moon and bring him back to earth
safely _,_ithin this decade has be_.n resoundingly expressed by two _.'esidents.
This T__tio.ual goal was originally enunciated by President l{ennedy in the s_m-
mer o±' 1962. 6 It _as boen s!m_lariy recognized, advocated, and Justified by
_i-._id., p, 92.
f_.
'°J:_nes ;,L Gri_m.;_ood,Pro,je_t Mercur_: A Chronology, (Wa_hingto_n, D.J,_
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P:'_.si6_.:_-tJoLnson as sh3;:._iin t__ fo!i_owin_ q,.otatZon:
'%:._S _"......:<_biO_." .:s em'd:<'::ed_:_.:_ bokcl pmogru.m of space exploration
=_.s_=u.rc_.,.,,i_ich ,,:imise ,.-;i'r_ c.h rewo.rds Im many fields
o: /_e_'iean l]./e. O.:z,!>_Jd_!<:ss i:: cietm_y in£icated by the
t<:'o_;_dscope o2 o_Lr p:_'c<]r,.,,_<:_.d_._,our intent <o sehd _en to the
'lL_Jrd; m_::'s i::satiLi:,l.eZ "_ + .....
is-ted siziee t_'_.,:e- ,_ -:',, "'".J....._o.........m:'.U:.:uso._c<=tion:..L"th:r._s_and contributes notice-
_bly in raising aY:d :uai:<todninc the _:_!::_. Z=_o=_ 07 tLe space progrm_, To
ascent -_o meet teeiu<ological pZuteaus _ill :kot suf/'ice - it is the su_.mlt to
which mankind aspires, albeit i,._oYrimgii;s u]tJ<_zt.: a_taim_t is not _:i_hin
o_e co_<l_ines of &_ty mortal "-. ._-,r,'s :"
,,,_t._out question, to assLm:_, any ot}er beLaVior _ould eventually sI_nil_y _
stag_.ation of the mi_d a_d the i):robab!e decl_ne or all tl_t which civillzed
man .holds dear. For ou_s in a _;rorld in _hich one cannot afford the lax_n_g .
of' resti_g on one's lanm_.Ls.
][isto_ has ever-so lucid]? relateG ho_.<countries who contin_<l</ and
relen_,iessly strive for exc.elle_ce !r: the tec.bnological arena frequen'_!y reap
b_meZits previously believed impossibZe. Dr. _-iugi-_ L. Dryden eloquently re-
fated this in the following st_:_-tcment concerning Zhe space effort:
lik'e_ Peoi_ies _ver_{here must retain a reliablu perspective from
:.;hieh to discern better the future scientifi<, social, economic,
:DoZitica], and stratecic consequences of dyn_mic advances now
i_ourth, the "s_,,ace race" if you will, extends _o the United States i:k-
valumbie, positive propaganda opporttmities. Conv,rarily, any laxity on its
r
f
:_:_ ,_:o_ ; S. Co£e Consressiona! and A(k:_iulstrative Ifews:
_J.___ :_,g-- _lr$% c, <.... _ . ._d._szo.:, (St. P:..ut, ±y,:>), _..5_
i )
_£_.e, o19. e!b., p. :_v.
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part could _mfortunately i_f!_c_ a dium_tric_l effect upon our world sz_tmre.
The accomplis!ments of bo_h _he United =."_.a_,_sand the Soviet Union<_n
b
space have made and will contina_ to make strong impressions upon the co-an-
tries and p<-oples of the world. This is true whether they be "a&vance& _' or
"emersir_" -- rich oz' poor. •
That the Soviets ha_e exploited their _p_ce feat_ to _ _axi_a is _elf
evident. That the United States has done so even more advantageously arid :,
openl? _ (thusly creating more of a cL,a:,_cefor adverse conti_gencles) is :_Iso _
r _ _"
In other words, t_e world community -- particularly thei "emerging" _._o'_- :'
tries whos_, systems of _vernm,ca_ and political idealogies are marked!_ in- .'
secu/'t -- im.s ]oeen give_, a front row seat to observe a mosL crucial co_:%est.
The %e__or typifyin S Zhls "face-off" is conspicuously _.ique for one se_s the
4
world's two most powerful nation,s vying to becon_e thefirst to !_nd men on
the m:,on and return them to earth ur_.;_rraed. Yet_ this contest in entirety is
t_,e superficial veil of good-naturea,<peaceful co_eti@_ing c_nducted under "'_ -
!
These "emergi_j" nations raay well recogn%ze a different per_pecti_ though.
for to them, this race is not n_:cessarimy_, a n_tch between t_o nations, but
rather' one between two opposing systems of govermr,,en_ - De_r_cracy vis..a.-vis
Co._rm'_nis_:_.This expositio_ provides them with ar_ excel!ent,(chance to compare
the expertise, resources, and efficiencs" generated by these: systems in their
paral!cl conquest of the moon and co6mic space.
i_ny of these small "emerging" nations really do not know or care Who
_:_r"b<:d i'izu:t i:_ this e::d<avo<', but the:< will be :i::::.<ensc.ly imp:-cssod \-,y _,:1.0
f_
state cf aff:_.irs, .,.he,._,c_s:.e_retl;: eli;}_.e___ beat_ the ; vlet; or z_ will
suf '-_rtL;, i :_ternatiorm3. _.oi2_ica! cOnsec uences
Finally, the _utho:' believes the potent_.YLit¥ of subs antive "te_ 3aolo_-
•/
<i
_.a.L splllover' stands as yet anoth._r reason f._r the high _riority as: gned
to tkt_ space program. Even today ezamp!es of 'tec}_ologic _i spillove:" are
present. Although some of the_;e may be consi6 _,red a dlrec_ result of our
space progr_n, the: _ do provide advances for the industries concerned _.hich _an
be classed as "s;,iilover".
Just to list a few of' these 'spillovers," one mawr first look to _he eo-,--
munications indust._y and the pronotnced effect the ._T_rl7 ?ird Satelli e has "_
:
:'i made. Or, one could cite how weat}er forecasting has bee_: improved t rough
the Tiros Meteorological Satellite. Finally, one m_st cre ilt the con inuou:: ;
breakt?_.-ougi_s whici:_ have emerged fa'om micro-mlniaturizatic _.ln the el_ ctron :.cS
lndustry -these advances are c_ssi_tlT_?;,tmerican industz_'s push to d,_mi_ate
the international computer market.
Y>,aever the fGndamental element de_m%nding recognition, here is th. fact
that our expenditures of money and inte!leet wlll undoubte&l_ be gain "ul in
/
the ye_rs to come. This is shown in ma_.'velou; fashion by _n erperien 'e _',iic_el
Faraday had over c ae-hu_udred years ago:
_M[c_hael Fara@ay was demonstra_.Ing his el_ etromagneti_ .equipment ,o
a British government committe_ in the ho] e of obtain_ sg gover_ne _t
s..ppor!;. One member admitDed he was fas,inated, but _$ked Farad,_y,
"blast pcactie'_l benefits can "e e_:pect?" "I c_n't a_ s_er that q "es-
t_:on," Farad_ 'Trep!ied_ "but can tell ,_,ou t1:_n one-aundred yea's
from now you aili be taxing s mething li_e this. "9 " .
"'_echnologic__ i spil!over" may &!-_.obe looked at in a slightly di fer .....
mann e::'. Foz' i3\SA_ like he_:predes :o 7,\CA, ,_._ asst_aed _% e role of % _e
";)_:bernard;; R_ cht!r,., r_n:, '_-,..... -_ R_ce_" , :l::Rii_]Stud 8 C-',_-z'te_>
::o. _, (_,._y _96_ ), p. ,.o.
_: ....
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,_.;::,j" e_:ber the; p-.c-L,_:"e.
......... b_:' :e o L" :_at_onal priori<, ;.,'ill _.P.
able _i:c ruad..:r %5 _::st::-',%i :eL L,._: Jie,l.. :.... io_':.}:,_ctivc i.<' _¢1ich Yull M:_',-rl_d:S...,
0:' tI:_; p_O\]_._rS L'ig'_e %o l_J) ;., ..) be _./.,,_l..,.:d. -".: :,¢h_]e _ho o7-i/n_::/, _;_:., ....... u
re, ! [ L[:,.,. ,.<_'..
: ..::.y 02' the-:.:-ob!e-,,_s /nhu.-:,_:-D to _//vaz2,;:ud &e:o._pace ],._seaz'ch _m,_ Devei._p-
::.,tnt (:::LD) l:rOject:: _re &,coLd.eLi ,,r _,_nJ,.:,.<:,_., _::,.. _u-::,:.or wilL: survey -ci:e:e _,,, she
r<:::_i.:,-i,:.: o:[ the (::-_-pt_r </ fi:..'.: _fE'_'.z-ding _Y.e z" <_.ier _,i-,:L_ a dive'tics:ion cf
" _ _- throu:;h
_.'c" i" :cOz's cz'i%ie_i to _,:=:rOSl,U.ce ]_lD _,,'ork uT_& ._,_ .. tot:chih_ on -_h_',=e
grc,_ ._::.obZ<:;_:s it. t:::e s.4%scque:_t ord[c_': stat,_.-o_'-c_-e-L_!; &ely,:Lees; c._&..__ .._
z'_lui_<.:,;ents _nd d___i'init.io-t_ u.: ,._-, lack of eo,_:.c d_t.-,
lb:i'oro {:ontir, aing o:_: it u.:igi'% v_c w_se t> enL::;ge :,':_- c_!e slight. &Lve.'sion
wkich w:/11 give t- .... " in-Lo the _,:.bel:/e'/able complu:,-'Iti"over-
sh;zdov:i'n:: ti.e snae .... _rO,Lrr_n. IL_ d]i_2: so the &_%}:_:' 'will not s:2sm_.t :,he
z'__.&de:"%o at: ei<%c;":itd te<zi:nio_L disc'<s_#.on_ _<:t r{_vther ]._:'ov±de g s9:=:" .li:,:
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statement made by Dr. c__e_, Zv'_ager of the Apollo Spacecz_ft Program (ffice.
before the Subcommittee on >_nned Spaceflight in 1963:
think somebody noted at one time that for Apollo itself we will
probably generate sufficient paper that if we piled it up it would
get to the moon before the Apollo spacecraft did and "_e are om our
!0
way -- as you can see.
Performance - Schedule - Cost
Obviously, the space program's high priority requires the realization of
adequate performance and a realistic schedule while observing cos___tco_straimts
which delineate th_ extent of its effort as provided under law by Congress.
As will be shown, the frequent interdependency of these variables proves to
be not only perplexing, but moreover the causal factor in many of the unique
R&D problems under study in this paper.
The American pledge to the world is not only the landing of men on the
moon, but also their safe retuz_n before 1970. Both of these fantastically
complicated exercises call for the near errorless performance of literally
millions of functioning mechanisms and parts which will be contributing inputs
over a period of several weeks.
I_D projects of this type are therefore characterized by "the ever-present
feedbacks among action, results, information, and ne_ action ''II that mus_ ul-
timately be assured through reliability criteria:
...in Project Apollo, in all of our manned space flight projects
for that matter, the key to the success of the mission will be
10U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight, i_6 NASA
Authorization, Hearings, 88th Congress, ist Session, May 8, 19oj,_ Part 2b,
(Washington, 1963), pp. !082-i08_
77
_Edward B. Roberts, __mics of Research and Develoom,Jnt, (liew York,
1964), p. xix.
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liken this phenomena to a vast, imterwoven configuration of standing dominoes -
if only one of the pieces in the entire system should happen to fall, they will
all fall backward, i
This does not necessarily imply that if one of the entities comprising a
part of the Lunar _cursion Module (L_M)_ for example, fails to meet a scheduled
completion date then virtually all other work on the LEVI must be frozen. How-
ever, in more cases than not_ this could happen in the subsystems of the L_
thus_r causing the probable delay of the overall program if it is not solved
expediently.
Furthermore, schedule as well as performance criteria forge a strong bond
with cost. The author will go into more detail concerning this relationship
later in the chapter. However, one fact should be emphasized immediately.
This is the grim reality that program lags and schedule overruns, regardless
of cause, will almost universally generate an upward projection of the total
program cost. This fact m_y be used in partial rebuttal to those critics who
sit on the fence's edge - those who would rather we deliberately structure a
reduced program level into the manned spaceflight segment of our space program
and thereby extend the moon landing date back as far as 1973.
There have been instances in which Congress delved on this very same ques-
tion, and in one case it was asked of Dr. Shea. On this occasion he provided
an answer which quantitatively exemplifies wi_v our efforts in the space pro-
gram cannot rationally be lowered and thereby stretched out over a longer per-
iod of time:
The Rand people, even without looking at the details of Apollo, h_ve
said, "Gee, the cheapest program is almost the q_ick_st program." As
long as you are doing it in _ so_d, rational way, and you are no_
ff
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performance, cost, and schedule criteria -- particularly in the design and test
phases of the RID activity.
Before yielding close scrutiny to the three broad problems associated with
F_D, a brief word on the "nature of the aerospace market" is in order. For the
market serving NASA's P_D programs is unique.
The majority of NASA_C's R&D work is accomplished through contractors
and subcontractors. MSC enters the picture primarily in establishing specifi-
cations for the various contracts to be let. In utilizing this procedure,
_<SA_C controls the technical guidance and policy aspects of its programs
while allowing free enterprise to assume its traditional role in the American
system.
The nature of the contractural work emanating from MSC is such that fixed
price contracts are rarely used due to the virtual impossibility of predicting
final cost. At best, incentive contracts may be employed, although this is not
practicable until the contract _has progressed _el! along in the test phase so
that both MSC and the contracting party can reach agreement on the cost-to-
completion - most variables are w_thin well defined parameters at this point.
Unfortunately, when contracts are or_ginally awarded, they are not suf-
ficiently well defined to meet requirements necessary under the incentive
basis. In fact, numerous contracts are let on the evaluatio n of performance
proposals submitted by competitors - such contracts will not even _contain
hard,are specifications initially. Thislphenomenon of ambiguousand frequently
changing program definition is a serlousproblem in aerospace R&D contracting.
More on this matter will be said _ater.
Thusly, MSC.can only advance estimates regarding the ultimate cost of a
given contract. Unlike many other goverr_ent agencies _oA/MSC us_lly _ _'
fF
P
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hold a contractor to a finite dollar amount for various goods and serviee_
rendered.
SOTA - Chan_in_ Definitions and Reouirements - Poor Cost Data
For the remainder of this chapter the author will consider the problems
of state-of-the-art advances, changing requirements and definitions, and the
lack of cost data. These areas will be discussed for their individual pecu-
liarities and then integrated with the material covered heretofore.
The state-of-the-art represents "the level to which technology and science
.18
have at any designated cutoff time been developed in a given industry.
Essentially it defines the terminal zone beyond which man cannot pass in the
technological development of hardware without first achieving basic theoretical
and design advances that are applicable to the task at hand.
State-of-the-art problems superficially at least are probably the most
obvious to the average person. For the notion of space travel (not to mention
landing, living, and working on the moon for a short duration, and returning
to earth) has prodded man's imagination for centuries. Yet we as terrestrial
beings have only recently moved toward realizing the capability of accomplish-
ing these dreams, and no doubt many people question our ability to do so be-
fore 1970 - with good reason. Such pessimism, although certainly not universal,
is frequently derived from statements released by prominent technical research-
ers which while not necessarily reflecting pessimism_ do relate concisely the
nature of various obstacles ahead in the space program:
It is an understatement to say that gaps exist today in the basic
technical knowledge needed to assure a successful manned moon shot.
18yzrtin Caidin 7 The _,_n-!n-Space Dictionary, (New York, 1963), p. _96.
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In fact, much applied research will be necessary to support this
!9
advanced development program.
The state-of-the-art (SOTA) problems confronting NASA/MSC may be charac-
terized as inculcating program uncertainty upon m_nagement. This is true in
any advanced R&D program which demands substantial improvements in SOTA.
Especially in the design and test phases of R&D, the degree of uncertainty can
be tremendous, due to two related factors.
For one thing, there is not always complete accord on the best method or
technique to accomplish the various parts of a mission. "Missiles and Rockets"
reported in 1962:
There is considerable debate by those participating in theApoilo
Program as to the best route for landing an American expedition on
the moon. Should it be by direct ascent? By use of Earth and lunar
rendezvous techniques? By means of a lunar "bug" which would ferry
a team down to the lunar surface from an orbiting spacecraft?
Until the decision is made, much of the technical effort on the
program cannot go ahead. Until it is determined whether that
module actually will land on the moon or remain in orbit, work
cannot begin on hardware. 20
If a delay in p_ogram decisions such as this occurs, the effect on SOTA
advances can be decidedly adverse because any delay will likely impose schedule
and cost problems. The intrinsic nature of advanced SOTA EAD work is su _h that
breakthroughs are not subservient to man-made schedules - rather, the converse
is true.
At times attempts to resolve this problem are made throughthe use of
parallel BAD efforts. However, this usually proves to be prohibitively
ex_ensive : " '
')
191_/.T_. Davidson, "The Case for Advanced Technical Programs_" Achievinq
Full Value From R&D Dollars, (t_rew York_ 1962)j p. 23.
20Wi!li_u J. Cough!in, Missiles and P.ockets, (Washington, D.C. ,:,kyo_
_ 15.
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The large cost of an individL_! program makes hedging against t_cn-
nicai difficulties through the use of duplicate or parallel projects
extremely expensive. 21
_reover, the extreme integration of most aspects comprising the space
program will frequently generate paradoxical _roblems. For RiD technical
groups traditionally strive to product as sophisti(:_il and reliable _ product
as is possible. 22 Frequently their efforts will create advanced tech_iques
or designs which exhibit superiority over existing hard,are. Naturally, when
these SOTA advances arise, those responsible for the program's success have
them incorporated and integrated with the existing systems even though highe_
cost and extended schedules are likely to result. _en queried on this prac-
tice Mr. Ho_nes replied as follows:
We found as we developed the subsystem of Gemini that it was much
easier to incorporate technology known today, not something that
was early developmental technolo_ of the past.
In developing the Gemini subsystems, we find that they are bett_r
and more sophisticated than initially conceived, and that the space-
craft is much more sophisticated t_n anticipated. Therefore the
costs tend to be higher and the time scales longer. 25
Thusly one may see SOTA as causing programmed requirements to change:
first, due to unforeseen P_D problems; and, ironically, second, because of
unexpected breakthroughs which are then incorporated into a given project.
However, changing requirements are not solely attributable to SOTA, for fre-
quently a lack of initial definition and subsequent redefinition is also a
major source of changing requirements.
The successful completion of the lunar program demands the integrate.on of
numerous complex subsystems which are highly dependent upon one another. If
2ipeek and Scherer, 0p° cit., p. 53.
221bid., p. 80.
2_1963 ?_ASA Authorization, op. cir., p. 8T4.
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not dependent in a functional manner_ they are depeudent f_'om the s tundpoJnt
of meeting specific physical design specifications such as configuration a_zd
weight if _uitary spacecraft requirements are to be met in the final assemLly
process.
For example, take the case of two !$_othetical subsystems A and B, both
of which are essential to the operatio_ of the L_ar Excursion Module. Suo-
system A is well defined while the concepts and necessary data governing the
development of subsystem B remain nebulous. Them, even though subsystem A
may be produced with the near perfect assurance it is acceptable, subsystem B
does not provide equal confidence. However, design and test proceedings on B
will be effected using whatever iimitedknowledge maybe available to produce
a functionally capable and rel_able piece of hardware.
But, as often is the case, new data obtained midway through the program
can alter the performance requirements and therefore the design specifications
of subsystem B. This contingency very possibly will necessitate a major re-
design of the hardware.
Furthermore_ there is a strong probability that these mid-program altera-
tions in subsystem B will mean the previously acceptable subsystem A must be
modified. Presentation data used in the 1965 BOB Hearings elucidates such sub-
system integration problems (changing definition and requirements) incisively:
Weight growth is still a major problem and is receiving continued
management attention. As spacecraft subsystem development pro-
gresses_ the weights become both more precisely kno_ and more
difficult to reduce. The impact of design on the Program may be
severe in terms of both dollars and time. W_ight control _has been
extended to the subsystem level and a comprehensive weight control
program na_ been established.
S_nce our presentation a year ago, the L_Mw_ight has increased
about i0 percent, increased the landing problem considerably. As
f_
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a result the landing gear design was changed from a l_O inch radius
contilevered gear to a 167 inch radius contilevered gear.
The problem is not solved, however. _proved land_g _dymamics
analysis have sho_n landing stability problems which we didn't
have the necessary sophistication a year ago to recognize.
The most significant lack of information lies in the soll mechanics
area. We do noZ know the soil mechanics of the lunar surface
(though we hope to obtain useful data from the Surveyor [2_'ogram),
but are studying the effect of earth soil mechanics on landing
stability of the L_EM vehicle in a_ effort to better understand
_he dynamics.
Any major change in the spacecraft design concept (as is conceiv-
able for LEMwelght reduction) could have a significant effec_ on
micrometeroid pro_ection. 24
The fusion of adversities generated from state-of-the-art advances_ cha_-
ing requirements_ and c_hanging definition_ formulate a milieu which exerts :'
formidable pressure upon cos_. This leads to the last general problem typi-
cally unique to R&D - lack of cost data,
Meager cost data may be visualized in several contrasting lights. First,
and highly correlated to all caum_l factors discussed here, is simply the
singularity of this immense undertaking. The affinity for cost projections
to display considerable positive variance in a program of this type seems un-
usually high and therefore accurate calculations( of Cost are not_readil_ i
construed, _ •
The two general problems examined previousl _ are responsible for m_ch of ....
the cost projection difficulties typical to R&D,: Foranyt:ime a projec_"s per,
formance and schedule parameters are by necessity adjusted to reconcilel changes
in SOTA or program deflnition_ costs will be affected. In rare instances the
effect will be downward, however usually the converse is true.
24^ .
_uo%e extracted from unassembled data used in _[_SA/MSC _ 1967 Nearings
before the Budget Bureau in October 1965_ Eouston, Texas.
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Another contributing factor to the lack of cost data is the enthusi&st:Lc
optimism on the part of contractors. _is dubious behavior is usually rewarded
thro_h the means of contract awards and ±nsicnificant penalties when the
contractor's original estimates are far off target.
!_elated to this fact is the problem of technical people also displaying
optimism in controlling cost. Their downfall can usually be traced to an over-
concern for technical facets of an R&D operation while diverting too little
attention to schedule and cost.
D. Rrainerd Holmes tied much of this together while postulating on cost
overr_s in the space program:
...firms may tend to be overly optimistic in their original estimates.
Industry mis_cuderstanding of teci_uical requirements and _\SA's pen_
chant for changing its mind on specifications are other pertiment
_easons for the higher costs. 25
}_wever, the exact point or factor of causation in cost ovurruns cannot
reasonably be attributed to any single entity. Instead, it is more logical to
rationalize these overr_.s as a hybrid effect which unfortunately can ap_roach
substantial proportions. For as _v_rshall and Meckling report:
Cost increases on the order of 200 percent to 300 percent and ez-
tensions of development time by a third to a half are uot the ex-
26
ception, but the rule.
Also not to be forgotten are the conditions governing and setting the pace
of the American economy. These may inflict pronounced effects upon the space
progr&_ due to the considerable research and development lead times many
25Charles 0. laFord, "Apollo Guidance Costs U_der Control_" Missiles aud
Rockets, (_shington, D.C.j October 22, 1962), p. 12.
.._rs_ and _eck!ing, o_. eit._ pp. 21-22.
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contracts in R&D cover. Various key economic variables such as wages_ the un-
employment rate, percent of industrial operating capacity_ prices, and the
full employment sux_!us to mention a few 3 may over time _Iter cost Drojectioms.
S_r_aarily, the author would like So mention the key points advanced in
this chapter. For the preceding discussion had dealt with a combination of
unstable variables whose interaction can have a very confusing effect u_on the
long range forecasting of plans, schedules and cost in space programs.
Figure 2.4 should facilitate gaining the proper overview of the phenomena
under study.
This paradigm represents the movemen$ of our entire space program from
the planning, operating, and evaluation fur_ctions. Starting with requisites
established through the Federal Budgetary Cycle and national priority, specific
goal orientated tasks or programs are instituted.
Next_ one enters into the area of operational catastrophe in which nearly
anything can occur. For it is here thaZ'one sees the interaction of three
crucial variables: performance; schedule;and, cost. Each Of these variables
is capable of affecting the other two through its o_a_ variance. •
To further complicate the picture, each of these prin_ry variables is
dependent upon three additional factors which have been treated as general
problems in this chapter: state-of-the-art advances; changing requirements and
definition; and, the lack of cost data.
All of these entities react over time to yield ameans for eval1_ti_g
program accomplishment and formulating estimates for future programming. BY
now, the heart of the problem central to]this paper should be emergi_ in
i
crystal clear fashion. For as we shall see in the subsecuent chapters, the
phenomena described herein are anything but in consonance. _'!_nis is the real
dilemma!
; ,_ _ _. _,_ _, "_l ,_:.,
f-
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Figure 2.4. - The R&D program paradigm.
I-._T Ii
AfSALYSZS OF TI_ ±_I_OB_.{
Part I of this treatise should be seen as prim_rily a mode for the intro-
ductiom, delineation, and exemplification of the p!._enom_'_._anr_dcr s_.._do, l._ow
Ci:at the reader h_ been given _ sketc}, of the objectives and par_:eters guid-
ing t_._eauthor's efforts along _¢ith a backgro_u_d _reatment on the m_.jor i_rob-
!_ms r,nderlying _c-_ _lem._,_.Cso_,' this stud_rj _ bramsition co a more p_:n.etrati_g
examination a_.d evaluation of <::<.topi<- will be effected in Part !!.
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C}£&PT_R 3
An Analysis of the Federal Budgetary C_jcle: Phases One and T_.Io
i
This chapter will focus once again upon a seg_uent of the Federal Budsetarj
Cycle: first, upon Executive Preparation and Submission; and, second_ on Con-
gressional Authorization and Appropriation. In so doing, other integral issues
such as budgetary theory will %e scrutinized.
%q_ereas chapter 2 dealt in part with the four p.hases of the cycle and
stressed schedule and flow phemomena, this chapter will show a much grea_er
concern for establishing a "feel" for the more subtle, tacit relationships
necessai_ to realize the appropriate "overview" of this system. The author
will investigate not only questions of "_hen" and "where," but also those
concerning "how," "why," "what," and "to what degree." Of course, all oC
these queries will be related to the ultimate factor of schedule in budget_ig
for the R&D function.
Yet another objective is to acquire in no undertain terms knowledge of the
countless interfaces and levels of perspective influencing the R&D bndge_ary
process. _q_ile a perfunctory analysis may yield no dlscernable consequences Of
importance in this area, the reader will learn in the following pages theft
nothing could be further from the truth. For as related by Berkley's Aron
Wi idavs _:
Presidents, political parties, administrators, Congressmen, .......
croups, and interested citizens vie with one another to have their
preferences recorded in the budget. The victories and defeats, _he
compromises and the bargains, the realms of agreement and the spheres
of conflict in regard to the role of national government in o_a-
society all appear in the budget. In the most integral sense the
i
_udoet lies at the heart of the political process.
IAron Wildavsky, _ae Politics of the Budsetary Process, (Bostou, 19]i__ p._.
f"
L
_e explicit role _,_C_'°plays in RiD budget formulatio_ and submis_ion, will
receive individual attention in c_hapter 4. _erefore, the author will speak
of ¥_ZC inputs in this chapter only where they are specifically identifiable.
The coverage to be given here will cow,tern an analy_s at Dhe National l_vel
and thusly _ _ ....rav1_a_e around budget proceedings in Washi_cton_ D.C.
_udgetary Theory
Zefore any further examination and evaluation of the Federal _udge_a_y
Cycle (FBC) is attempted , the reader should [_J_derst_nd the reasons, both im-
plicit and explicit, why govermnent must rely so heavily on _the ._C° In fact
/
while pondering over this point in issue, one might even more ra%iona!ly in- i
crease the scope of the question and look at the necessityfor all people or
organizations to budget their resources.
As stated earlier, most people, organizations, gover_m_ents, and entities
thereof, possess limited reso%u_ces which they can employ for accomplishing _nd
mee_!ng their various desires, objectives_ goals 3 and aspirations. Because
these resources are limited in quantity, they are termed "scarce" by means of
definition and must be allocated amongst _competing projects accordlng]y. This
action will necessitate the use of a budget whose function may be likene@ to
the discipline of economics - namely, to _Iseern: "_
.. °how men and society choose, with Or without the use of money,
to employ scarce productive resolzrces to produce var_o_s commoditie:_
over time and distribute them for constmuption, nc%• and in the futurc_,
2
_nong various people and groups in society.
_asically then, a budget may be characterized as an evaluatio_ (usu_ll)_
in dollar te_s) of a given entities capacity to purchase the reso_rccs to be
=Pau_ A Samuelson, _honomics An "_ _ 6th edition,
..... •ntroductory _u_a!yJi_ ;
(_ew York, 1964), p. 5.
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used in achieving its goals. Becoming more specific, we see _h_t to mee<_ it_
overall_purpose a budget must weigh and relate four factors: (i) the ob,]ec-
2 ' '
tives and goais desires; (2) the methods or work plans through which _he ex-
pressed]objectives _nd gOa_s are to be attained; (3) the resources necessary
to _implement the work plans at the rate progr_rmed for in the budget; and,
(4) a finite _express_ion of these resources in dollars. This does not neces-
sarily imply that all budgets advance singular proposals_ but rather they m_y
be either singular or pluralistic in terms of being vehicles for decidi_g the
way to derive maximal gain from a given amount of reso_ces through the use
of alterr_ative plans Of action.
However, before getting into the mundane use of budgets in the FBC, the
author would like to delve on one more general aspect of bud_etir_g - the
planning function. For esser_tially the FBC and budgeting are nothing more
than highly sophisticated inventions which enable one to plan more ef_ _veJ.,
while adhering _o the constraints of our democratic system. _ew sc:_o._._=__
i_ractitioners of management _!ll refute the hypothesis that planning is o-<,_
of the most important functions in an organization. For without pian:_i:-_6 or_o
could not ratiol_ally derive the four primary factors comprisi_ a budge_
(mentioned above). Although planning, _er se, easily warrents a stud_ _ i__ it-
self, Just a few characteristics of this activity particularly relevant to
R&D will be touched upon immediately - others will appear as the chapter
progresses.
Planning is an activity whereby one _t_empts to accurately define variou-_
parameters throt_zh the use oi' historical, present_ and future analyses concer_=-
ing a prcgr_m and thusly reduce _he variance in its crucial elements to _,
minimum. _bwever, the most carefully lald plans can p_'ove to be _mbarra.ssi-_g!_ _
_f--
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erroneous for factors which m&_,/or m_ynot bc charged -0_'_the pl_n_2e_'. For ex-
ample, a good plan must rest upon the solid foundation of perceptive _ss_/_p-
tions relat "_,_'i_tAe _!an to its milieu candidly. _ey c/_sode<c_nd__::ona stable
political setting which will ascribe consister_cy of purpose to a plan's objec-
tives. If' either of these fac_co_schanges, which well maybe die c<_sei_. RAD
plans containing prolonge8 le<_dtimes, one's plans can qaickly 0ecom<.poor
projections. Unfort_unateiy budgeting in govermnent is Lard-presseS _;ofacili-
tate the demandsof such occurrences:
]_t is axiomatic that gover__ent budget-making should be flexible and .
capable of adaptaSion to changes in governmental r_,sponsibilltJes.
i]ut in manygovernment the procedures - the phases of the budget
cycle - are so rigid and so time-eonsmning thas adaptation is dif-
l'!cult.
%_hemain - " _}oino to be rememberedis that fomnal plans afford a:_agency
meansby which it maymore rationally makea decision that would otherwi_ be
the c<_sc. In addition, well docmaentedi_.....,_L_n;_provide the meansfor program
implementation and can b_ used whenever so desired in appraising th_ degre<
to which objectives and goals are being achieved.
_efore scrutinizing specific actions in the preparation and submissio_
of a budget, the author will makeone more general observation. This is simpl$_
that budgets are continually being generated in two cons%tasting ft<shions, and
the final formulation of a budget in the FBCnecessarily represent_ a fusion
of these two methods.
First_ one sees the birth of" budget estimates at the "grass roo_s" level
of an organization. St0csequently these estimates filter up through the v<r-_ica'._
*Jesse Z_rckhead,Cover,anent budgeting_ (New York, 19,s), 7- 2_<,.
_2
levels of the agency'and other gov_:rr_uemtirLstitutions to be incorporated :into
T,_bxecutiveBudget a_d acted upon by Conzress. Frequently this proced;_u-eis
referred to as "budgeti_.g from tl':e, bottom up."
Understandably though, if there _,Tassole reliance upo_ this type of br;_zet
_'o_nulation, our nation would _-:otbe able to 2_oduce all t_e resources under
demand The d_na_d schedule would sim_Ly oyez'pOwer Zhe suDp!y av_._,_,,_le.
The technique used in eliminating such 1:'cults adopts the opposit_ phil-
osop.hy of "budgetin_ froFa the top down." Under tl.is procedure those indivi~
duals and institutions situated at the apex of the tlzreaucracy make a__ analysis
of existing conditions and probab2e futr_e needs as they r_late to a given
budget. _is calculus includes myriad f_ctors as diverse as the "_-"
enviro._ment, "acts of God," the state of the econorr_/, and many others, Ti:ese
are integrated and evaluated according to relic various resources dema_:d as
priorities are established. Then guide!imes are d_livered to relevan_ sub-
servient bureaucratic units from which -they can in turn use to allocate re-
sources withzn their organization, i
!n reality neither method of budget'_ is eO_olete!y dominant over the
other, and one is usually being played off the other throughOut _he budge!_
process, WY_ile this may seem somewhat paradoxical andcontradlctory no_ the
ensuing chapter should assist in ci_rifyi_g this phenomenon, These _ao e!e-
merits of vertical budgeting are in flux throughout all phases of the FBC _._a_'_
not just the two phases understudy in thie c_p{er.
The remainder of this chapter wlll b_ directed at the lnitial two phases
of the FBC. To facilitate the description of schedule rela_ion_hlps the a_thor
will speak of the typical budget proceedings to be t,uken for FY 196_. Also,
/
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this will enable a treatment of the 3udget Bu_'eau'_ new P=anning-P_ogramming-
Budgeting System which is being _ed to formulate the budgets of most cabinet
level agencies or others o<' sm_s_c._t_.ml size i:'_ciuding
3xecutive Pre'narat:!om and Submission
_%u_:_et Previc_E
As early as January, 1966, the "<_uadriad_" consistiL_g Of the Zudcet Bu_'eau 5
Federal Reserve Board_ Treasm_'y, and C,o_m!cil of Economic A,iVlsersj WAIl m_.et
to discuss_ _nalyze, evaluate, and forecast the range of critical economic
parameters which will dictate the probable state of the ecc_o1_7 in .,_ 1968.
Quite evidently, this must be done before valid projections ey.pressi.<_g govern-
merit revenues for _i !968 can be made which wil_ in turn iarg_iy d_!_neat_
the tenor of gover_m_ent policy and th_ substance o±' its _rogrsm_s for ti.a_:year.
Once this "embryonic" evaluation has b_en reached, the Pres1_e._ _ill dis-
cuss t_,e broad policy positions which may be p_rsucd with the Director or
Budget Bureau and a decision on the over_ll expendi_'_Lre level for ;<q_1968 is
originally cast. Ho_,_ever, this "expenditure level" is much more realistically
.... "expenditure range" which beco.,_._:._ of _umerous contingenciescAaracoerlZe& &s ar_
may be either an _derstatement or an overstatement of government activity in
)Y 196!3° Nevertheless_ a basal point must be derived in early 1966 from which
+he A_ministration can institute its fmrst evaluation of Lhe foreseeable pro-
gram scope in _U{ 1968 -- then it can expand a_d refine upon them as tLe pre-
viously projected variables become more accurate and reliable. This evaluu-tion
4
3'oa_eau of the 3udget_ Plar.ning-Pz'o_ra_mning-Z.'dseti_.,g_ _u!leti.u i_o -:" _
...... _ctooer 12. - ), cuod v_de, i>p i _=_roug_._i_(_'a _:::Lng_on, < _ . 1965 . " ...... -.
(%_• ,-. L_ ,
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process involving the Pre_ide_,.% and the "Qm_d_iad ''will essenbia!!_r c_.t ......
right up to the time of the _ 1965 budget's l"residentlal submission _co Co:_-
cress in Jamua.ry, 1967, a_d the:_ on into the clven i'_!o To do othe_.:ise_
would be inconsistent with the most ele_uenta_/ principles of sound i_l:_nniag
and budgeting (not to mention "polm'_-"_co_").
Yet projections of expect<d reso_aazce levels are of _::<.,value "-'Lt ,.-,-'_ corr.-
!ated to the need for the jivem resou_"ces. 0nly after a_praisinj_ th,_ .,_'_._-
mentaz_y requests and their summation effect on total predicted resoLa'ces caT-'
rational policy and program decisions even hope to be made. TLerez'ore, in
March, 1966, the Budget Bureau will issue a "Call" for the FY 1968 p_'eV!ew
budget submissions (preliminary estimates)from agencies 5_ the ExecutiYe
BrancL. This "Call" will relate the A_ministration's board policy position
which will be of concern to the specific agencies.
The Budget Bureau is unquestionably a dynamic, highly Competent (altho_,_h
"_derstaffed) orgazlization whose allegiaace is singularly directed toward the
President, and rightly so, due to his near pleb_ry reliance upon .the.'_lIn b_d-
geta_j affairs. BOB has since its oreation under the .Budge_. and Acco_atSng
Act of 1921 held massive responsibllitie_: in assisting the _esident arrfve at
a credent b-udgetj however_ thls is becoming an increasing!y._ifflcult ta_k as.
goverrmzent's burgeoning role assumes greater diversity and _omplexity. It is
Aaron Wildavsky _s belief trot:
Aside from the complexl_¢ of individual budgetary programs: there
remains the imposing problem of making comparisons among differ_:.z.,t.
programs t._ have different values for different peop._e. No m_°tter
how haz'd they try, therefore, officials i_ places l!ke She Burc<-.,_of
the Budget discover that they cannot find any objective method of
jadging priorities among proble,_s. _
"Bureau of the ]gudget, P!:_n.uJn_-P:_o_ran_,,.iz_,q-iD_.q_et:i_ --, ._)a.-l_t....7:o.
(-.,Tashington, October 12_ 19o_, os.Ladv.Td_._e_PD. i g]._:'Ot_g]'_il,
:.)5
T.';'%ile_e question of exact_r ho_._muchanal)=Di_al o:),i.;ctivi_y 7!_02is c__p-
a%le of rendering progra_,s _mderthe National budget rem._imsopen_ O_:_ £v£!.get
• m 'Y" "_ ' _....£........ Q: ...."j2ureau ms effecti.':S new _.l_u_.._£,- r_r r_ma;_<,-Bu_ ,_:Lh'_>S/stem thi_; _,ear at
the reouest ol..... Preside.ut _"_ ;""' " " '
_ _-_ .......u_. wil2 _ '_'" '_ oojec c:_vity to t£e :,BC.
discussion of pure -orogram i-,-_-_,--.... "J-_ao - .,*g 5s not :in_ende& :qer:-:, but specif:-c pro-
visio_-s of t2::i,s new syst¢:a >,'ill _,e. mc->tione&_ p&rtJg;,tl&2'_]j T/_.6£2 re2v.y_..<.Z _0
schedule aspec-0s oE the Cycle,
Approx£mately at the same t_ae (_rch, 1966) bOB iss:;:cs i-_s prev;ew _"Cuil, '_
NASA Ke_tdquarters is engaged in pz.e_ring a "tentative _re_Aew" for a,%f19P_
from data ger_erated 2n the oo-I POP, As we s_ll learn i2 more d_tail.in '"
chapter 4, the _,_C ir_put for this preview estimate constitutes the buqet i_,*-
fo_atio>_ supplied by this Center exclusively through 02-0 oo-i POP.
O-ice r,_,'_,N=oA Headq_aarte2's has all the neccs_'.ary 2r_routs from the fie Ld_ ,_hey
will ............ - _2nc__,_e this data and mc_ke an .analysis eonsideri:.:_: past _ecom'oiis]:nen_s_
existing eo>sr_itme_r_s and oblisations_ a2d futv_e ne_ds of' both est_h!ished pro-
grams and proposed or_es. Then decisions reg_rdinz kT_SA _olicy m'as-_%c effec_ed
regarding the .agencies' preview request for FY 19_ z,resources, This data is
subseciuent!¥ translated into N_acA Program Memoranda and is transmitted to the
_dg _ Bureau by >_y i_ 19oo. &_so_ throughout _rch and April, £0£.2receives
Special Studies from NASA which "may involve intensive e:<ami_ation of a .arrow
subject or i:-cad review of a wide field. ,'7 The preview estimates are primarily
used Zo resolve broad policy issues and afford them with an associated gross
dollar figure,
=:_ POP _>re e_s to tl2e _.... a._ gToera-Si:_.<::-o_2v ...... L_\-'- &lid L-';:;;(.'iltiL_'Lly ]7'_. ,.'fes._:1 ;£3
EL S'l['d,2'-'.,2.2i01". 'O/i' i'I_T3_]:L_' S _*i_]qC_*ia2 'p!;--_£. UTlis (J_al:£Jl]Cb / ",'Ji&(2 L..... ._]_.ea._ J;. .'.liq;|, LLL,QeEE
;.,.t fi,e.].d -i..r_':;tallatioz_S az".& adjusted ao :::oado_rters. C::L(_ez- )! will ,ov_-.: -%
< . .
uX'bO:'2;; : YO.L"F.
7_uz-'ea_: c}::" the 3udse%, o-o. :;ii., :p. 7-
g._ f
Do
i<_ _JA •-r, f ' .- .9b!iowing receipt of-the _ c_ pr_vie_¢ estimate for :_.,ic .:nd _ts _'_view,
the DLsector of the Bud,jet _tu_@a!_ _;ill meet with LA&£A's Administrator to dis-
cuss the Agencies' _'eques% in light 02 the AGmini:_bratioi_"s ow_rvi_: on tLe
scope and content of gover!mlen;_ progrc_ms in }%_ 19]i_,.3 !;o:_:in:_!iytkis _zill
occ_ _ _.round 0ku_e I_ !966_ and at th:ir=time b].e Adm_i4istru._or _¢ilI L,_'ovide _he
BOB D:ir,=ctor with up-dated buagc- Cata generated tkroudh gl_e 66-o r_6:_9
This session extends to _hc A(m_inistrator an oppor_._:.__ityto personal]<<
convey Lis Agencies' plans_ aspira%io_us_ and resource ne<,_is for the given
year. Conversely, the Director is a_o_ded _ chance to !)_ay n=s role as the
President's "right hand man" in bu(_et matters and _ccordi_gly str,::;s the
degree to which _C%SA'_. programm_d activity levels may Le met in vi_w _.-_tl.c.
.%@_inistrat!on's total projected comznJtments. 0i' co_rs_, the 7_ire<_¢._;"s :Dosi-
- I ,] -_tion relates the latest feedback from the "<uadri_.d," of which Le is a m_.,,u__,
and the most recent policy decisions derived from the co.utinui_g a:_'_]ysis of
the "big pict_mes" by the Administration.
k'j the end of June_ the first part of the _xecutiv_ ?_eparat_on and Sub-
=_ission phase is complete. This represents the initial bab_le in %h,_ Iong
range confrontation to strategically plun for, request, mL_d wind aDproprJat_d
nu_ ob].igatiomal authority. _efore continuing the analysis _of the __._,__'-Aue
author will advance a few com_mnts and observations concerning the iugerac-Sions
of this preview period which are pertinent to NASA/_C's ?£,.Dbudge% formulation
]_rocess.
_ona_a Bo_unan interview on _/2/oo.
9Se e .... 11.
c_:_pLer ..
r_
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Rrevie'.¢ Perffod Observa:_3o :s
OR_ of the most sel:f-evlder_C and significant expositions emerging fz'cm
this initial l_eriod is _he ui-_i:ed o,tte:upt to _-reate cons;,T,uence betw,,_en tLe
sovertm_nt's program base _.nd t_e spec-taciB o:f the I,Y 1968 expendit: re b_s_.
- .L' .... 7 ..; .l::clusive in this action are _e %e(_n__,:cues c: budge'tint] from %he 'h_ottom up"
and the "top do,ran"along with a %toad pL'ojection of futuristic par<<:ters of
_'rI . . %criZica! im_ortance_ to the eco_._omy. ..:asly,. agency heads, _e"_ :Zu_e-_. Buz'eau
Director, and other membe_.s of _h.e :kd<ciz:_.istrationare making the r ='::-:-ru.<
evaluations of' our nations dom_stic, :ZT:ter_acLonal, and _._ens_ positions
f r " _- "for _r 19o8 and then trying to i,_culca_<, cor_sonanc:e be£w ,n them a:.d the
multitude of discrete resoarce demands del_in S thsir jurisdiction_ _'tom
subordinate u:_its.
Y,:.-_ LrBerest hez'e is not directed toward the ideal!sZic value ,_'rthe
J
present system or u_ycle_ if you will. Rathe=" the L_uthor's fozcmost pa_'pose is
to analyze the FBC in relaOioR to the I_D bucset function at I%_S.%/]:::C. iupsua_r4
to this inqv_iz'y, one h_-potnesis will be stated now and rei:_forced _n bhis
treatise's ensuing pages _nd ciz_p%ers.
_p_cm_zcally_ the nature oi!'the Rd_D f_tion does not permit _= ........:=_
econometric analysis and projection oY need_ per Lsji, that _iil &eve!o.> _r. a
i,_fbend.m..___o_?_.12 months after the cessation of the -f,revi_w 'period ...._,__,_ _.D
activity is without question a volatile _ _ .....en z_y which displays negligible
affinity towards progostic effo_'ts, _nere are those who main_in the dlff:-
cu!ties in the R&D arena may be aVtributed to a lack of analytical .:o,/:-_isti-
c_t_o! a:_d expertise on the par< _L,LL'operating orga,_.izatio_s, ibwe\ _,., wh::ic
%-:_ ,'L. is an _.!em_c_.t of _-'_'t_h ' _"' " ' "
L__%._'e.; _!_&_ the intrinsic natR::_e of txe K_:O end,_:s_'ore_s -orofcsse ....
f-
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,-,t<,r _ sho<:Id be _he t_£'Sc% _'._;r i_:dic_cm_:_4 reg_:_'dir<i positive <_i,:_!i:.g
c,.,s% cstima-ces,
This ....... _ _ _n,,,_.<:au,w the _c_ss of cl,___i,er ] _.<d:,_:_,_L oe lue.].d if O...:' simpi'. ..... " .;_ _- "
the lead t_ne implications der-v{-xi f'r<m the p-.'evior esb:k:i;..Se co:'.co&J"I,,prar;tJ.ced
in Redei=ai budgetin C. 9%r t?:<: bL_ik or the <!;m"_;_ Jiicorpo_'=bed Jn _Y_.3/'.'.; p_"evlew
I'.]Su£'_ are Sellera%ed at %he "Sc<_s:J roo-bs" (i._. Skc Centors) in Ja.i_:_z'-j-
-_o u. _%. operat%ional Jnception u:,.d a r:,_-__-±_, months i:_.advance of ti:e PI 19_$ ; _ ..........
m'_uq or ]0 ms::ths before its CU_dL;r[Jm&CiOn. %'IiS d::t:,_ is ,'._,:_tm,e_,::ted b::.-new L ,8Se<
:'_cts availabie in April_ 196,3- :!-5monbhs before the firs-6 dollar _:-d,"be oo-
lJsat.-d. K[_ile such budget Ic::6 t_,--,s :_y be acc,_ptabi_: to the mot,.: s_atic
_ser.eies of gover_;_cnt ohar_Zed wish traditio:,al and _zel]. _.T1dersSoe_: i}roS;'u,,.s
clisp!mying extablJ.s_<ed his-borJ{;:2l patio:ms: they usurp l%%SA R<D prog:':_:£s :!,.to
m position of add<d! has&/':]! e,nd u2":certaimty while sJ_i_l%a_<eousl_p" ex b:r_,r: ti. ,i] _::e
flexibility so vital in s<_,:h a discipline.
AS this point the reader :_ay justJ.fiabl V ask, :'_%_y is there suc:_ co--,_t<r-
natio:_ over -policy and budget plans if' Lhe est_uns, 4e is oni_7 a _prevk'..,' and
thereby at best an appro;,.imut:i.of of the ulti:.'u_te -:txccu%r;ve decisio., concc:r:.i:_g
an agencies _ program, scope ai..d substance?" AC_ittedly, _ the pre;-:.._,; e;:b L:,mte
were just a vague approach to r<}::_ity, budget and other _gency off i..::i;}.Isw ,.id
_reathe somewhat easier in as_-_-_i_.blinz and su'bmitting thes< estLma%:s.
However, with growing consistency, the preview estimate is becc_._i_g the
"ceilins figum_e" over which agencies (including NASA) may not cross 1._ fo:':;__:-
latins -their budgets for a given fiscal year." In other words; the iLikei:P:ood
is g_'e_t that K_ASA's preview budset estimate senerated in _rch, I'A':]<, will1
z"eprese;-_S the maxJmum dol2_ar ficure for which %he ,.sen(:y m;:_y bc ........... "_....._.
%1^ '
.,._4. This %,y no _ea_,-_s "____,,±.........-;e_- bereft'bent asenc'ies will ' .ee._.,,:, NT • :<_c_.: L,
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this preview figure/ In fact, the prevlew budget figure is characterized as
a "st_mit" by many Washington budget professionals. Over the course of an
Administration's pre-operational budget evolution, most agencies (including
NASA) run the risk of having their "s_mmit" incrementally shrunk by finite
bits and pieces, although the degree an agency is affected varies according
to their function and the overall state of affairs existing throughout the
relevant period. This is because after the period in which the preview
estimates are prepared, the FBC enters a phase in which BOB is concerned
primarily with cutting priorities and eliminating what are considered to be
"marginal" programs. One finds that it is only the projects of the highest
priority which can gain entrance into an agencies' program once the Cycle has
passed the preview period. 12 The "contracting stmmmit" phenomenon is one of
the principal reasons why budget officials demand their preview compilations
epitomized a relentless effort of unquestionable integrity.
The tremendous impact an agencies' preview estimate may exert on the final
amount of NOA it receives will necessitate the adoption of numerous Intricate
procedures, especially in external relationships with other government institu-
tions holding substantial power and responsibility in the budget process. The
cruclality of these interfaces means that policy inputs must be refined and
implemented in as sophisticated a manner as possible so that an agency can be
victorious in the competitive battle for appropriations. This is accomplishe_
through close alliances with top management, the prudent reading of and _.ivim6
with political undercurrents, and the development of a sound strategy.
In formulating a strategy of optimal value for advocating its programs,
an agency will essentially be involved with the Bud6et Bureau throughout this
12j. Dawson - interview on 8/23/6D.
t-°.
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preview period. While other institutions enter the picture before the _cle
is complete, concern throughout the Executive Preparation and Execution phase
is again primarily with BOB.
Therefore, the strategy employed in exchanges with BOB is of expressed
significance not only in the preview period, but also throughout the year and
during any phase of a budget's development. Naturally an agency will at._empt
to request and obtain the maximum number of dollars they think their programs
can Justify. Yet to continually submit estimates substantially higher _han
the NOA received will mark an agency as irresponsible and consequently their
proposed budget will likely be subjected to mechanical cuts irregardless of
merit. Or conversely, such agencies will discover their budget submissions
coming under scrutiny in an excruciating fashion. Neither of these situations
is thought to be beneficial in the opinion of an agency.
Quite naturall_ then, there will be a concerted effort on the part of an
agency to establish, nurture, and sustain effective rapport with the Budget
Bureau. Most agencies believe this is imperative even though the real authority
to appropriate monies lies with the Congress. For the "budgeting game" is at
best an esoteric process in which life can be much more bearable if mutual
respect and fluid communications exist amongst the principal participants.
Hereagain, the reader should intuitively recognize potential problem areas.
NASA must be reasonable knowledgeable on the status in its programs in F_ 1968
before it can rationally develop the strategy to use in pursuing _aonies for
that FT. As previously shown, the inherent nature of the BAD function makes
this an arduous task. Neverthel_ss# NASA must assume a position from which it
can substantiate its budget and accordingl_ the Agency constructs a preview es-
tlmate for its FY 1968 activities. While accuracy historical_y has left much
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to be desired in these estimates, at least the initial actions are taken and
the Agency passes from the period of the preview to that of the final estimates
which are incorporated into the President's budget.
Final Budget Estimates
The interactions, assumptlons and phenomena governing the preview period
are also very conspicuous over the duration of the final budget estimate per-
iod. For the entire" FBC is directed at a singular objective - the development
of a sound National budget. Changes realized over this period are more of de-
gree than substance as the Administration is afforded an increasingly clear
portrayal of the parameters (economic and political) which will ultimately
delineate the new obligational authority level for FY 1968.
By July, 1966, the President has received all agency preview estimates and
the "Quadriad" has finished a complete re-evaluation regar&Ing the revenue-
expenditure projection for FY 1968 which is subsequently incorporated into his
Administration's plans on the budget. Another factor which must be schrewdly
analyzed is the Congressional climate and particularly the fate of legislation
coming before the authorization and appropriation committees in 1966.
All of these data will be integrated and a resultant "overview" will
emerge sometime in July. Then the President resolves the issues concerning
FY 1968 program and fiscal guidelines, and transmits this information to the
Budget Bureau Director who subsequently disperses a "Call" for final budget
estimates. In compliance to the President's direction, the agency "Calls"
relate guidelines, format, and other pertinent information which must be ob-
served and included within the agencies' final budget submission. The "Call '_
could occur anytime from late July up through August in 1966.
Upon receipt of the BOB "Call," NASA Headquarters will initiate steps
toward generating the stipulated information. The primary input relied upon
will be the 66-3 POP which is consolidated and adjusted at Headquarters by the
middle of August, 1966. The procedures and techniques instituted are almost
identical as in the preview period with the exception that all facets of the
estimates require noticeably more detail and Justification.
Also, NASA will likely deem it advisable to engineer a slightly different
strategy in its final budget request from the Budget Bureau for several good
reasons. First, the Agency will have been assigned an explicit guideline
whereas the preview estimates were cast _u_er no such constraintp but rasher
under the broad direction of elementary policy decisions a_vanced by the
Administration at that time. Second, NASA will possess a more comprehensive_
and reliable projection of its FY 1968 resource needs by September, 1966 _ as
this is significantly nearer that year's program inception than would the pre-
view estimates were calculated. By no means does this necessarily imply that
the final estimate lead time is acceptable in R&D budgeting. Contrarily, the
author simply ranks it as the lesser of two evils. Finally_ one must recognize
the germane fact that there are no provisions for FY 1968 program alterations
after these final estimates are cast and concrete. For once any agency has its
budget put before Congress, they theoretically must be as adamant in its support
as is the President. Occassionally though, agency heads will overtly show dis-
may over their final budget as d,Tived through the Executive Preparation and
Submission process.
Thusly, one can visualize two possible strategies. One would be to "come
in" with a final budget estimate over the BOB gUidelines while the other would
be to "come in" at the Administration's figure. In either case one is not sure
of the final outcome.
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The maneuver 'of submitting estimates above the guidline position might
be practiced under several conditions. For example, recent_ positive economic
indicators could be the deciding factor in advocating such an attack. Or,
strategic contingencies of salient scope directly associated with our space
or military stature may drastically and swiftly occur thereby Justifying an
immediate policy redefinition in N_SA's programs and accordingly in their
total dollar budget. When submitting estimates which breach guidelines 3
one must be thorough, rational and protect one's flanks at the same time. In
so doing, all estimates must be extrapolated for FY 1968 in detail, and what
12a
are termed "marginal" programs must be projected in depth and ranked too.
(These "marginal" programs if eliminated completely would force the overall
budget under the BOB guideline. ) Yet under the conditions described above the
agency would believe there is adequate political pressure to warrant a budget
over the guideline figure.
The other strategy is to "come in" exactly on the guideline. The rationale
behind this approach is essentially that of playing the cooperative role and
hopefully enhance your likelihood of receiving a equitable piece of the pie
from the Budget Bureau. For in either of these strategies there is an excel-
lent possibility if not a certainty that an agency estimate will be cut when
12aone note of clarification is called for here. What the author refers
to as "marginal" programs are often considered absolutely vi_al by nume:_ble
NASA advocates - yet "marginal" as used by the author denoted programs rut
essential to effect a manned lunar landing and safe return of astronauts within
this decade. Admittedly such a definition surports negative Implicatiozs for
our integrated evolving space effort, however the author believed it is
candid evaluation as will be further related in chapter 5.
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the Budget Bureau makes its recomendations ("mark up 't) to the President.
However, here again, NASA will submit estimates of their hard-core programs
and also relate which programs are "marginal." These will be assigned prior-
ities so that if cuts are instituted the Budget Bureau knows which programs
they are extirpating.
.The months of October and November (1966) will then serve as the span
over which the Budget Bureau exercises its comprehensive examination of NASA's
budget. To facilitate the mechanics of this process hearings are held, infer-
real contracts are made, and an analysis is ultimately finalized. The Indivi-
dual assuming the primary responsibility in this scrutiniz_tion is the NASA
Examiner. He will continuously keep pace with the _gency and throughout the
year maintain liaison with Headquarters and the Centers in an effort to remain
as knowledgeable as possible in this area. Probably in late November 19663
the Examiner will extend his recommendations on the NASA FY 1968 budget to a
Review Board and they will in turn make rec_maendations to the Director of the
Budget Bureau for incorporation into the Administration's FY 1968 budget.
Typically this assessment and recommendation is termed a "mark up." As stated
earlier, the "mark-up" frequently is lower than an agencies' guideline:
The Budget Bureau is expected to cut partly because it has an in-
terest in protecting the President's program and partl_ because it
believes that the agency is likely to pad. 13
Top NASA management is notified of said action and afforded an opportunity
to make a "reclama" or an appeal, if you will, on the BOB "mark Up." Those
issues which cannot be resolved through NASA-BOB consultation will be f¢.rwarded
to the President for a final (Executive decision.
.... . • . n. ,
13Wildavsky, op. tit., p. 23.
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the middle of December 1966, all a_ency budgets have been determined
with the possible exception of the Defense De_ent. The President will
once again pay heed to the "Q_adriad's" predictions for FY 1968 t re-examine
the integrated National budget, and institute any modifications he deem
advisable in the light of this latest ana_sis.
Simultaneously NASA and other agencies will compute fiscal and program
schedule data pursuant to the President's s_tion budget pronouncement.
These will ideally be submitted for inclusion in the President's Budget Docu-
ment and Appendix by late December. Finally the phase of E_ecutive Preparation
and Submission for the FY 1968 budget will be consunnated when the President
submits his budget to Congress in January 1967.
Final Budget Estimation - Observations
The general characteristics marking the generation of final budget esti-
mates are much the same as those inherent in the preview period. The obvious
difference is seen in the more explicit parameters governing the process and
the transition from ambiguous to specific actions. Budget refinement of this
nature carries with it both positive and negative implications for the RAD
function.
On the positive side of the picture NASA is obviously extrapolating under
a less ominous lead time and therefore the uncertainly factor is diminished -
this is an improvement_ but only that over the lead time found in the preview
period. Consequently s decisions made concerning program content and ms_nitude
can be expected to be a better approximation of what NASA will in reality need
in FY 1968. Moreoverj the Agency will learn over this period precisely its
fate as the Administration chooses to cast it.
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Paradoxically, this firming up phenomen_ creates a serious problem in
the NASA I_D budgeting function. For with each succeeding day the budget be-
comes more finite, more easily identifiable, and accordingly the ability to
vanquish sudden program adversity is impaired. Yet the reader may asst_me such
an argument is _superfluous and unwarranted in view of the fact the FY 1968
NASA budget still must pass through the most crucial phase of them all -
Congressional Authorization and Appropriation. The author suggests twu fac-
tors in refuting such an argument.
First, the Administration view with contentiousness any agency which
attempts to bolster its budget a_;er it has gone to CongreSs. There would have
to be a major failure in one of NASA's first-line programs which could be re-
couped only through a strong influx of additional monies before the Adminis-
tration would even consider backing such an addition to the budget.
Basically, what this means is that failures of less importance affecting
programmed FY 1968 work will be circumvented at the expense of "marginal"
programs. This may be necessary if NASA's lunar landing-safe return objective
is to be effected as planned, but _such actions portend negative connotations
for the long duration capabilities in space endeavors of the agencyj not to
mention the United States. Unfortunately the next phase to be studied is un-
able to sufficiently cope with this situation as we shall see.
Second, even if the Administration believes more monies should be extended
to NASA, for example 3 the cyclical aspects of the FBC may make this politically
impossible. Particularly so in years when the projected revenue base may shrink
from where it was earlier forecast. A lower revenue base together with the
fact that other agencies cannot be feasibly cut back by the President al.L added
to a substantial increase in the NASA budget would suggest a deficiency which
p-
!
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will be politically more serious than the slippage in the space program.
Therefore, the funds will not be advocated by the President although Congress
may come to the rescue.
Once again, we have seen the curse of uncertainty associated with long
lead times as the basic problem. It is am entity which represents the primary
derivative of most RAD budget difficulties_ and yet something that under our
present FBC must be lived with.
/
!
/
.Congressional Authorization and Appropriation
The budget year is now approximately _ months away as it is late January,
1967. The Executive Branch has been engaged in plannlng-programming-budgeting
activities for over 12 months, yet the authority and appropriations so funda-
mental to its agencies' programs has not even been considered by Congress.
However, this is without question the most important phase of the FBC as one
can readily imply from Article I Section i of the United States Constitution:
All legislative .Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.
Although either House in the Congress may initiate _ctlon on appropria-
tion bills, the House has tr_dltionally assumed the role of taking first action.
Approproation bills required no fiscal authorization in Congress until 1'337 at
which time the authorization provision was adopted. Therefore the NASA _ 1968
budget will come initially before the House Cogmlttee on Science and Astronau-
tics in February 1966 for the purpose of authorization. The full Committee will
hold hearings over this period and subsequently divide into Subcom_Ittems which
will meet until the middle part of April 1967.
The Manned Spacecraft Center has special interest in the proceedings un.
dertaken by the Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight. This is not surprising
considering _C's primary programs are in the manned space flight (MSF) arena I
and MSC will prepare presentations, fiscal and program data_ and other infor-
mation for these hearings as requested -- it is not unusual for this Subcommittee
to hold some of its sessions at the three principal HSF Centers including MSCo
After hearing literally hundreds of pages of testimony, countless ques-
tions and answers, and making a genuine attempt to execute a persevering 3 in
depth analysis of the MRF programs, the Subcommittee on HSF will transmit its
findings and recommendations to the Committee On Science and Astronautics.
The full Committee will then consolidate and integrate these subcommltee data
into a bill which is reported to the House. Traditionally, the House accepts
the recommendations of its subcommittees who are much more relatively knowledge-
able in their given assigned areas than are other members and hold the real
power. The House authorization bill should be resolved and passed by the end
of April 1967.
Following passage of the NASA authorization bill for _T 1968 in the House_
the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences will initiate hearings
on the same bill. However, the role played by the Senate is markedly d41fferent
from that of the House in both the authorization and the a_propriation concerns.
One finds that: _ -
...Senators value their ability to disagree on items in dispute as a
means of maintaining thei:_ influence in crucial areas while putting
14 ....
the least possible strain on their time and energy.
lhl'bi__d., p. 52.
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The Committee will accordingly examine carefully any "reclsma" NASA submits on
the House bill for FY 1968. The hearings will attempt to scrutinize these dif-
ferences and finally the Co_ittee will report its findings along with a
recommended bill to the Senate floor where it is usually accepted by the other
members. This action will not be completed before mid-May and frequently much
later.
If any variance exists between the Senate and House versions of the NASA
authorization bill which is more often than not the case, the Conference Com-
mittee composed of members from the two substantive committees mentioned herein
will meet to resolve the differences. Their report must receive approval in
both the Senate and the House. Assuming this is achieved the President will
sign the NASA FY 1968 authorization Act in May or early June, 1967.
There is one very important fact the reader should learn about the explicit
structure of NASA's authorization bill which extends constraints on the lepro-
g ramming of money. The authorization bill lists by program the finite amount
of dollars that may be appropriated. The act for FY 1968, if similar to the
one for FY 1966, will go on to state that:
...no amount appropriated pursuant to this act may be used for any
program in excess of the amount actually authorized for that partie-
ular program...
unless (A) a period of thirty days has passed after the receipt by
each committee of notice given by the Administrator or his designee
containing a full and complete statement of the action proposed to
be taken and circumstances relied upon in support of such proposed
action, or (B) each such committee before the expiration of such
period hastransmitted to the Administrator written notice to the
effect that such committee has no objection to the proposed action. 15
15"NASA Authorization, 1966," U.S. Code: Congressionsl and Administrative
New__ss,No. 7, (St. Paul, Minnesota, July 20_ 1965), pp. 1232 through 1934.
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The connotations advanced in this section of the act will be investigated
later.
The authorization process is usually thought to be more involved than
the subsequent appropriation period. For many of the programs are given the
most substantive inquiry when before the authorizations committees.
Pursuant to Article I Section 9.7 of the United States Constitution i'no
Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by law..." Accordingly even before the NASA Authorization Act of 1968
/
is passed in the Senate and signed by the President, the House Committee on
Appropriations will consider the NASA request for monies beginning in March
1966. The specific NASA bill is then transmitted to the Independent Offices
Subcommittee which holds the primary responsibilities and power for appropriat-
ing NOA to NASA. The Subco,_ittee will send an approved bill to the Full
Committee whereupon conculsory approval is reached before the bill is recom-
mended and submitted to the House. After the NASA Authorization Act of 1968
has been signed by the President, the House will take final action on its
appropriation bill - hopefully by mid-May, 1967.
The Senate Committee on Appropriations comences work on the appropriatlons
bill in M_y by submitting the legislation to the Independent Offices Subcom-
mittee in the Senate. Once again, NASA will advance a "reclama" to the House
bill when it feels Justified in doing so, This reaffirms the Senate's basic
role mentioned beforehand and is exemplified candidly by Senator Thomas :
It has been the _licy of our (appropriations) c_ittee, to consider
items that are in controversy. When the House has included an item,
and no questions has been raised about it, the Senate C_mnittee passes
16
it over on the theory that it is satisfactory...
16Wildavsky_ ._it., p. 16.
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Sanguinely by mld-June the Subcommitteewill have extended to the Full
Committee its recommendationsand the subsequent transmission to the Senate
will be effected by told-June. Floor approval in the Senate, followed by the
Senate-HouseConference to resolve existing differences would occur, and the
bill would be sent to the President for signature into law.
The President will route the proposed legislation to the Budget Bureau
and they will afford the agencies affected therein (Independent Offices _ppro-
prlation Act, 1968) an occasion to seek Presidential veto or public recogni-
tion of the bill'_ deficiencies as they see them. By June 30, 1967, the
President will sign the act into law - hereagaln, the reader should realize
this is an idealistic depiction of the Congressional Authorization and Appro-
priation phase's schedule and frequently agencies including NASAmust operate
under a "Continuing Resolution" until late July, August, or even later. The
Congress is an independent institution in the most literal sense and does not
function under a superimposedschedule such as the Executive Branch must..........
Before discussing the characteristics of this phase, one general pro-
vision structured under NASA'ssection of the Independent Office's Appropria-
tion Act, 1966 bears mention. The Act stipulates that:
Not to exceed 5 per centumof any appropriation madeavailable
to the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration by this Act
maybe transferred to any other such appropriation. 17
This meansthat NASAmaytransfer up to 5 percent of appropriated f_nds
from R&D,A0, and C of F to one _other. Thusly under conditions where money
is available in the AOand C of F appropriations, NASAcan transfer thes._
17"Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 1966," U.S. Code: Congr._ssional
and Administrative News, No. i0, (St. Paul, Minnesota, Septmmber 5, 196_),
p. 2436.
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funds to R&D programs. Of course, in programs where these additional incre-
ments would create program levels over What is authorized, Congress must be
notified as related in an earlier quotation.
In addition, there are two other external controls imposed upon the FBC
system which are not specifically elucidated in either the authorization or
appropriation acts. Revised Statute 3678makes the condition that:
Except as otherwise provided by law, s_ns appropriated for the
various branches of expenditure in the public service shall be
applied solely to the objects for which they are respectively
18
made, and for no others.
This promulgation is of course to be associated with the language of the author-
ization act concerning reporgramming and should be analyzed in that light.
Furthermore, Revised Statute 3679 explicitly states that:
(a) No officer or employee of the United States shall make or
authorize an .expenditure from or create or authorize an obligation
under any appropriation or fund in excess of the amount available
therein; nor shall any such officer or employee involve the Govern-
ment in any contract or other obligation, for the payment of money
for any purpose, in advance of appropriations made for such purposef
unless such contract or obligation is authorized by law.
In addition to any penalty or liability under other law, any officer
or employee of the United States who shall violate subsections (a),
(b), or (h) of this section shall be subjected to appropriate admin-
istrative discipline, including, when circ_stances warrant, suspen-
sion from duty without pay or removal from office; and any officer
or employee of the United States who shall knowingly and willingly
violate subsections (a), (b), or (h) of this section shall, upon
conviction, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for not
more than two years, or both. 19
The implications of this statute do not warrent pointed reiteration, although
chapter 6 will regress to consid_r these provisions which are known as the
Anti-Deficiency Act. i
18"Money and Finance," United States Code: Annotated, Title 31, (St. Paul,
Minnesota, 1954), 31:628, p.' 496. ..........
19Ibid., 31:66_, pp. _13 through 517.
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Congressional Authorization an_ Appropriation - Observations
The author will initially yield a survey of the FBC's second phase before
generalizing on the aspects in the Cycle pertinent to P_D activities (exclusive
of the execution and.aulit functions). Heretofore, the author's description
of phase two has not been substantially expanded upon from chapter 2, for as
stated in the introduction the interest is not so much in flow mechanios, but
rather the more subtle, yet crucial interactions of relevance to the E_D budget
formulation process. The ensuing discussion will extend same insight to the
crux of the problem at hand.
Several factors regarding Congress and its members must be grasped before
the correct overview may be assimAlated by the reader. First, anyone who has
even the slightest knowledge of the philosophy underwriting our democratic
system is cognizant that Congress is an independent body which by and large
owes its primary allegiance to the multitude of singular constitutents who in
reality determine the composition of that assemblage. Second, and equally sig-
nificant, Congress is an institution with an unimpeachable genesis which reveres
its traditions, mores, and methodologies _that have become so deeply ingrained
with the passage of time.
One more fact before succumbing to specifies - the increasing complexity
of the world today. While this is an obvious develo1_ent, the author wonders
if we appreciate the far reaching connotations this extends towards the ma_ .......
facets of everyday life. Specifically that which technology _va_ces, _opula-
tion grows, international relationships near i_comprehensibility, and the
National _dget expands at will, the United States Congress _embraces its ancient
methods as staunchly as ever.
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For example, in FY 1926 (Just 40 years ago), the Administrative budget20
was _.9 billions which is a mere _ percent of NASA's total appropriated NOA
in FY 1966. Over this 40 year span the Administrative Budget has burgeoned
astronomically to the extent of realizing an approximate 3787 percent increase.
Over an identical period Congress has seen the House increase by zero members
and the Senate by 4. This represents augmentations of 0 percent and 4.1 per-
cent respectively - Congressional Committee Staff remains rather small. These
data manifestly portray the fact that while budget responsibilities have
aggrandized in near geometric proportions, the corresponding manpower affect@d
has achieved what amounts to microscopic gains in reS_tiveterms --this is not
to be construed as a flagrant indictment of Congressional capability, but
rather a recognition of an area in which it may need assistance. For as
Arthur Smithies states:
Reform of procedures of Congress has lagged far behind reform on the
Executive side, not because reform is less urgent, but because Con-"
gressional procedures seem more intractable and are deep-rooted in
21
tradition.
The enigmatic nature overshadowing nt_nberous agency budgets to come be-
fore Congress is candidly recognized by many of its members:
It is not surprising.., that one runs across expressions of dismay
at the difficulties of understanding technical subjects. Representa-
tive Jensen has a grand-daughter who is mentioned in hearings more
often than most people, and who is reputed by him to have read "all
the stuff she can get on nuclear science.., and she will ask me ques-
tions and she Just stumps me. I say, 'Jennifer, for heaven's sake.
I can't answer that.' 'Well,' she says, 'You are on the Atomic
Energy Commission Committee, Grandpa.' 'Yes, i he replies, 'But I
an not schooled in the art.'" A cry goes up for simplification. _2
20The Administrative Budget is a measure of the United States Government's
revenues and expenditures excluding trust fund transactions.
21Arthur Smithies, The Bud6etar_Pr99ess in the United States, (New York,
19_5), p. 89.
22Wildavsky, op. cit. , p. 9.
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Compensation for such insecurity, espeically in RAD budgets, is attempted
through several means.
One method is to interrogate the agencies' principal witnesses very in-
tensely with little _egard for the budget per se, but rather the witnesses'
integrity. If the Congressmen can establish that the witness is an individual
of substantial competence and remains "cool" while under fire, they are much
more likely to have faith in the budget he is advocating - a budget which is
virtually impossible for them to understand completely.
On the other hand, Congressmen may choose to investigate functional areas
for which they are relatively k_owledgeable in contrast to many of the highly
technical areas of the budget. Here too the evidence of prudent, rational
management in an isolated functional area will greatly enhance the legitimacy
of an agencies' esoteric technical plans under proposal in the budget.
Or, a Congressman may approach being termed an "authority" in narrow
segments of an agencies' technical programs. He may then direct questions
of a markedly pedantic nature which frequently require advanced preparation
to answer. If agency staff have been sufficiently perceptive or warned in
advance, they will answer such questions with ease. However, if this isn't
the case, their agencies' immage and its budget may suffer accordingly.
It would seem that the above techniques may leave something to be &_sired
in a body whose paramount mission is to formulate policy. Admittedly, adminis,
trative review is also a Congressional function t but even here there appears
to be little consonance between methodology and purpose.
The massive dimensions and dumfounding complexity of the National _udget
has generated yet another phenomenon of interest. This is the increasing
ireliance on the part of Congress on incremental budgeting. Agency budgets
are simply too large to analyze completely each year. Therefore a base of
comparason is needed which has traditionally been historical budget data:
Budgeting is incremental, not comprehenslve...it is based on last
year's budget with special attention given to a narrow range of
increases or decreases. Thus the men who make the budgets are
concerned with relatively small increments to an existing base. 23
This incremental, historical approach purports several effects. For one
thing, the inability to achieve an indepth coverage of the National budget
has accounted for structural and procedural constraints as shown in the author-
ization and appropriation language as well as Revised Statute 5678. Congress
also displays concern for variance between obligations and accrued cost in
R&D programs, yet the intricacies guiding these programs are frequently not
understood. Arthur Smithies strongly believes:
The Congress has never made effective and system_tlc use of the
review of actual operations as in instrument of control, in part
because the Congress has been more anxious to control the Execu-
24
tive than to promote its efficiency.
The implementation of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System is another
step forward in the Executive Branch, yet it will not accomplish its ultimate
purpose until Congress discards its archaic functional exEalnations and adopts
a more realistic program orientation. 0nly if Congress can initiate actions
guided at translating concern from its historical, fragmentary, and nonprogram-
matic budget procedures toward a true program technique will there be any
marked improvement in the FBC. For modernization of only the Executive Branch
is of no value unless accompanied by similar efforts in the Legislative Branch.
23_bi___d,p. 17.
24Smithies, op. cir., p. 49 .
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To do otherwise may be likened to building the Empire State Building wlthout
structural steel and reinforced concrete - a virtual impossibility.
Yet, one must not become provincial in assessing the mechanics of the FBC.
One of the fer_nost factors governing this system is the political environment.
For the Cycle itself is essentially a procedural device engendered to expres_
political decisions and realities.
Any agency which has demonstrated fair success in the budget process has
undoubtedly been involved in prudent "political gamesmanship" - the following
quote serves to elucidate this:
"It's not what's in your estimates but how good a politician you
are that matters."
Being a good politician, (these) officials say, requires essen-
tially three things: Cultivation of an active clientele, the
development of confidence anong other government officials, and
skill in following strategies that exploit one's apportunities
to the maximum. Doing good work is viewed as part of being a
good politician. 25
Therefore, it is most important to present a dynamic program or the Congress /
may well designate another cut and thusly lower the agencies' buret "s_m_It ''.
There are many agencies advancing programs in this phase and invariably many
of them will receive budget cuts - the principal desire is to avoid such cuts
or keep them at a minimum. As W. A. Jump relates:
...unless departmental representatives proceed to present their views
point in a vigorous and tenacious manner, objectives which are essen-
tial...to the public welfare mightj for the time being at least, be
submerged by some purely budgetary objective, or by the budgetary
26
power, rather than served thereby.
25Wildavsky, op. cit, pp. 64 through 6_.
26W. A. Jump, "Budgeting and Financial Administration in an Operating
Department of the Federal Government." Paper delivered at the Conference of
the Governmental Research Association, Sept. 8, 1939, p. _.
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There is another factor extended by phase two that no doubt affects
agencies responsible for substantial P_D programs more than any others. This
is quite simply the schedule relationships Congress works under. The main
problem is that verily no budget is assured of appropriations by the inception
of a new FT. When new monies are not appropriated NASA must operate under a
"Continuing Resolution" which tends to produce detrimental consequences upon
both on-going and proposed programs.
Take for example a program where NASA is rising up the obllgational curve
towards its apex. This situation necessitates incremental obligations of pro-
gressively greater dollar magnitude. This is nothing unusual, but rather a
simple fiscal reality - at given times more and more money is needed to achieve
programmed objectives before decreasing costs occur. Any other method of fund-
ing breaks program moment_n, increases overhead costs, generstes second_a_J and
tertiary derivative problemsj and creates inefficiency and waste. Yet# thls
is what happens frequently in R&D program budgets as a result of "Continuing
Resolution" funding. :_.
The reason for this Jamming-up of the schedule will be synthesized from
a multitude of conditions ranging from filibustering in the Senate to th,'_,,sheer
and ever-lncreaslng complexity In the budget itself. Regardless of causation
though, the implications of such an occurance on an P_D program may be very
• serious indeed. It would seem Congress does not hold a full appreciation for
the adversity such a schedule lag generates.
This difficulty also occurs when an R&D agency program developes a crises
while the agency is under "Continuing Resolution" funding. Obviously flexibi-
lity and new funds are vitally needed under such a contingency if irreparable
schedule, cost, or performance im_irments are to be averted. However_ once
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again, the damage will probably occur before funds are appropriated and
apportioned.
The nature of the Congressional Authorization and Appropriation phase
especially as it advances crucial connotations to the R&D function has been
explored in the antecedent discussion. The succeeding relationships should
be emphasized.
For one thing, the primary thrust governing this phase is political. This
is not an attribute held in esteem by P_D planners. Alternations in the polit-
ical environment, either domestic or international, may substantitively neces-
sitate a readjustment of plans, objectives, and schedules as funding expecta-
tions evolve.
Recognition must also be accorded to the complexity of the National budget
in general and the R&D budget in particular. Therefore, it is essential4y
impossible under existing analytical and methodological techniques use_ in the
Congress to gain the necessary overview of the whole process or many individual
agency budgets. The author believes decisions are frequently made in a void
where all the facts have not been integrated an_ consolidated as extensively
as they well could be with a few changes (see chapter 6) in our present system.
Naturally, when decisions concerning NASA's P_D effort are being case before
all their subtle implications are understood, various R&D programs will likely
• suffer.
This inability to evaluate all aspects of the advanced R&D programs is
acknowledged by the Congress and rectified in their eBtimatlon through restric-
tive language in the authorization, appropriation, and Revised Statutes legis-
lation. Yet, dynamic R&D programs in which flexibility is most vital are in-
hibited through such language moreso than need be.
8O
Moreover, the mechanics and values dictating the tenor of committee
hearings must in all sincerity be Judgedas in violation with the principles
of merit. This fact maybe especially crucial in advancedR&Dwork where
"cost-benefit" and "cost-utility" are very difficult to apply objectively
in the various projects.
Finallyp the futile schedule fluxations inherent in Congressional Authori-
zation and Appropriation is another major burden in the R&Dbudget formulation
process. For examplepNASAis not only frozen at or lowe_ from a given budget
level, but is also forced to structure unnatural lags in its on-going and plan-
ned programs when Congress fails to appropriate N0Aby July i in a given year.
This phenomen_can reach critical proportions.
Manyof the phenomenarelated herein by the author are lucidly s_%rized
in the following quote by Jesse Burkhead:
In every moderngovernment there has been increased centralization
of of executive budget authority and increased staffing for the cen-
tral budget office, with frequent reorganizations of budgeting and
financial procedures. No comparable centralization has occurred in
legislatures; the trend here has been toward decentralization of
budget-makin_ authority. 27
Howeverbefore a_v postulations are advancedthe author will explain the
exact role MSCplays and how it is fulfilled in the NASAbudget formulation
process (chapter 4). In addition relevant budget data and a discussion _here-
of will follow so that the reader may see doc_nented proof of the phen_nena
l
set forth in the preceding pages (chapter _).
27jesse Burkheadj Government Budgeting_ (New York_ 1956), p_ 315.
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The ProgramOperating Plan
The preceding chapter delt expressed_y with the first two phases of the
Federal Budgetary Cycle as it interacts at the NASAHeadquarters and Washington
level. The writer's interest will now transfer to the "gragB roots" portion
of this process and concentrate on the M_nnedSpacecraft Center's role in the
FBC. In so doing, this chapter will center around the Research and Develop-
ment - MannedSpaceFlight Programs - Program Operating PlanI (PGP) generated
at MSC and consolidated and revised into a unitary RKD MSF POP by the Office
2
of Manned Space Flight at NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
Obviously, some type of fiscal plan must be formulated by MSC if the
Center is to meet its charged duties and responsibilities in providing Head-
quarters with the data necessary in Compiling the Agency b_dget. Since
January 1964, NASA has relied upon the POP as its primary instrument in accom-
plishing this task. The ensuing discussion will examine the POP's purpose,
format, and schedule aspects before yielding an evaluation on the document
itself.
A
r
_ereinafter referred to as the "POP".
2MSC also suhuits POP's separately for Advanced Research and Technology
and Space Sciences Programs. However, these are relatively insignifican_ at
MSC and will not be scrutinized individually. These two submissions are
identical in format, although scope and substance found in them differs from
the R&D MSF POP.
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Purpose
Basically the POP is nothing more than MSC's financial plan which por-
trays historical, present, and futuristic budget information. Since its
creation in early 1964, the primary purpose of the BOP has been to serve three
functions.
First, the POP relates both preview and final budget estimates advanced
by the Center to Headquarters each year. These are essential inputs into the
Agencies' overall budget.
Second, this document operates as a plan which designates the probable
rate of resources authorizations and allotments. Included in this plan are
the typical recurring issurances, "Continuing Resolution" activity levels, an_
any year-end adjustments implemented to achieve the maximum utilization o_
Agency monies. One admonition is warranted here - namely, that the POP extends
absolutely no authority in any sense to operating officials within NASA. As
already stated, it is simply a plan of projected resource needs.
Third, the POP is instrumental In affording NASA a basis by which the
status and performance of previously planned obligational activities may be
thoroughly analyzed. This is a fundamental requisite of rational budgeting,
as plans cannot be improved upon until detrimental phenomena identified _:.hrough
an historical evaluation are segrated out of the program or otherwise a_Justed
for.
Format
Quite naturally, a budget document such as NASA's POP must be structured
and operationally implemented to furnish resources data which will be uniform
in composition regardless of the generation point. The subsequent description
83
should clearly delineate the format subscribed to by NASA/MSC and simultaneously
set forth explicitly what the POP entails. The writer will use the 66-13 POP
in the following discussion as an example -- although POP formats vary over
time, the primary concepts inspected hereinafter are well established.
The first concept relating to format coming under study will be the POP's
substance. Hereinafter, all entities comprising the POP will be referred to
as llne items by the author.
Under this writer's definition, any given _ such as Apollo con-
stitutes a discrete llne item. Yet the Apollo Program is divided into specific
projects (in the MSC 66-1 POP) which are necessary for the ultimate attainment
of that Program's objectives --namely: (I) Apollo Spacecraft; (2) Mission
Control System; (3) Apollo Space Operations; and (4) System Engineering. Eac___hh
of these projects represents a line item and upon stmmmtlon they will equate
the Apollo Program llne item.
Furthermore, given projects of a program are each subdivided into units
called systems. For example, the Apollo Spacecraft Project is formulated from
systems such as the Command Service Module, Navigation and Guidance, and
the Lunar Excursion Module to mention the three most prominent ones. Thg
• author also designates each of these as line items. However, for any given
projects, one does not always find all of its specific systems included in a
single POP.
5This POP was generated at MSC in January 1966, and reviewed and adjusted
by NASA Headquarters staff in February 1966. This code will be explained later
in this chapter.
F"
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Finally, the POP has line items representing major and minor contradts.
M_Jor contracts are defined as i00 million dollar total value obligations
while minor contracts must have a total obligational value of at least
i00 thousand dollars in addition to being designated as a minor contract by
Headquarters.
Thusly we see five distinct units qualifying as line items. In the 66-1
POP there were eighty-two llne items listed in these classes. The data found
in the POP's llne items are summarized at the Program, Project, and selected
systems level. This summary information is manually prepared while the afore-
mentioned line items are a mechanized printout run from computer facilities.
Hopefully this treatment on line items has provided the reader with in-
sight regarding the budget items covered in the POP. Now the author's t_-eat-
ment will gravitate to the specific financial management concepts related in
a POP for each individual line item.
All line items scrutinized above are evaluated in the POP through the use
of six information inputs. These are: (i) obligations; (2) accrued cost;
(3) work days; (_) direct manpower; (_) unfilled orders and advanced funding;
3a
and, (6) accrued cost rate.
The strong reliance upon an obligational calculus in the POP is well based.
This is self-evident if one recognizes that the Federal Budget is formulated
primarily in the light of N0A to be alloted competing government programs. The
entire process ranging from the preview estimate, budget estimate, authorization,
appropriation, apportio_nent, and finally to the Agency allotments observes the
budge_ from an obligational orientation.
..... ,,, , , ,
3aFigure 4.0 constitutes a blank format used for a typical line item.
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Thusly, one may view obligations in the following manner. Each line
item 5 will have its actual cumulative obligational status as of 12/31/6_ and
planned obligation (of money appropriated but not yet obligated) designated
for two periods: (i) all FY's before FY 1965 as a discrete summation; and
(2) FY 1969. As we reach the current FY (1966), cumulative obligational fig-
ures for each month are entered. FY 1967 is similarly related although pro-
grammed cumulative obligations by the quarter are relied upon here through
the use of September, December, March, and June d_ta. Finally, each line item
will have yearly obligational levels (non-cumulative). posted for FY 1968
through FY 1970. The line item total obligational figure for all years is
given as a gross summary of the above information.
A second essential financial management tool implemented in the POP is
the notion of accrued cost. This affords MSC management a periodical gauge
of future dollar disbursements levels in a given line item. For as explained
in chapter i, accrued cost enumerates in simple terms the dollar magnitude of
work being done by contractor(s) on a specific line item, particularly in rela-
tion to the ensuing disbursement which will be incurred for the given workloa_
If a line items accrued cost assumes unwarranted proportions, swift action must
be taken to rectify the situation.
All actual accrued costs are lumped cumulatively for Fr's before FY 1969
while data are entered singularly for FY 1965 and cumulatively by month for
466-i POP is used in this example concerning format.
51n the discussion on format, the writer assumes hypothetically that all
line items considered herein had monies programmed for the times under dis-
cussion. However, this will not be the case I00 percent of the time.
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FY 1966. The ensuing FY, 1967, relates cumulative accrued cost for the last
two months of eac____hquarter (i. e. February and March, etc. ). FY 1968 through
FY 1970 are recorded as yearly (planned and non-cumulative) accrued costs.
The contractors 533 report 6 for accrued cost is also included. The last entry
for accrued cost will be a summation for all the years in which the line item
has programmed funds. Accrued cost and obligations are both entered as present
quarter (66-1) and prior quarter (65-4) data along any existing difference.
This is to facilitate quick comparisons between the projections of the two
quarters.
The importance of accrued cost necessitates the employment of several
indicators to assist in analyzing its frequently oscillating parameters. For
if accrued cost fluxuates, NASA_WSC management deems it advisable to possess
secondary indices substantiating or refuting the accrued cost input.
One technique implemented in the POP is an examination of the work days
in each month under consideration. The 66-1 POP designates by month the work
days in FY 1966 and those in the last month of each quarter for FY 1967 for
selected line items. These facts are valuable in evaluating variance in
accrued cost and determining whether it is reasonable or an anomaly.
Another utilitarian method for establishing the rationality of accrued
cost is through an inspection of direct manpowe r. This is a finite disclosure
of the man years input for selected line items in the 66-1 POP. As with the
work days device, direct manpower facilitates understanding the degree of
6This is the basic fiscal document generated by the contractor and used
by _C in compiling financial data on line items. It lists the contractors
historical funding levels along with future programmed ones.
-r
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credence in a line items accured cost, for it should vary in approximate pro-
portion with accrued cost. 7 Here again, inequalities implied through manpower --
accured cost differentials would substantiate more exacting analytical efforts
into the problem.
Accured cost rate is an additional POP input of central importance. This
is simply the rate at which cost is accrued by contractor(s) on a given line
item. The 66-1 POP depicts this on a monthly basis for FY's 1966 and 1967.
FY's 1964, 1965, 1968, 1969, and 1970 have accrued cost rates set forth fir
the month of June only. These data are especially gainful to program manage-
ment staff in judging current FY contractor rate curves, and to financial
management staff in ensuring ample future funding on said line items.
The last major concept to be discussed is that of unfilled orders and
advance funding (UOAF). UOAF makes reference to Just what its name implies,
specifically, orders which have not been filled or delivered and monies which
have been advanced to the contractor(s) prior to identifiable cost accruals on
his (their) part. The cruciality of UOAF is accounted for in that it together
with accured cost for a given FY cannot equal more than the total obligational
authority available to whatever line item is under consideration. This par-
ticular summation relates the fini_____t_level of funding necessary at a given time
and is thereby a most important input to financial management as a line item
developes. The 66-1 POP records UOAF amounts individually for FY 1964 and
prior years as a summation, FY's 1965 through 1970, and the gross total for
all FY' s.
7
_Direct manpower includes only that which is being applied to the prime
contracts. This accounts for 50 percent of the total manpower working on a
line item - the remainder come under the subcontractor and are not in the. POP.
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All of the line items alluded to in this chapter are given at least gross
coverage in a manually prepared summary section of the POP. Also it should be
noted that if contracts are not given singular recognition as line items in
the mechanized schedule analysis, they are included in the same mechanized
portion of the POP as part of a line item which summarizes all contracts not
otherwise encompassed in the analysis schedule.
The numerical data extended in the summary section of the POP are aug-
mented by specific assumptions and narrative statements around which the 66-1
POP, for example, was generated. All striking alterations realized since the
last POP (65-4 in the writer's example) must be interpreted and Justified -
particularly those constituting a portion of the current year and the budget
year (coming FY). Such explanations should account for reprogramming actions
and in so doing delineate probable program tradeoffs, additions and deletions,
and derivative schedule effects.
Before consummating this section on format, a few observations are called
for. First, the preceding data, upon integration, yield a well documented
financial plan which accommodates the implied requisites previously discussed
under the POP purpose section of this chapter. Secondly, there is substantially
more detail rendered the current year and slightly less for the budget year.
And finally, this document serve_ a dual planning purpose; one essentially
for programming staffs and one for primarily financial management staffs.
Now, the writer will elucidate further aspects of the POP by initiating
an examination of schedule relationships inherent in the POP. These carry
very profound connotations for the entire study and reinforce much of what has
been related heretofore.
9o
Schedule
No doubt the reader has implicitly assumed that the POP is a quarterly
issuance -- this is correct. The document is prepared at MSC during the first
month of each quarter in the calendar year. Thusly, MSC POP complications are
taking place in January, April, July, and October of every calendar year.
The reason for this schedule may be traced to several causal factors.
One of these deals with NASA's internal generation capability in the planning
and budgeting functions. A quarterly submission rate establishes consonance
between the POP and such things as the contractor's 533 report along with
internal up-dated obllgational readings. Moreover, it is believed that quar-
terly compilations lend the agency data needed to meet specific external bud-
get needs. In other words 3 the POP follows a logical sequence for yleld:ing
preview and final estimates, effecting "Continuing Resolution" Operations as
tranquilly as possible, and adjusting year-end monies.
The reader should now peruse figure 4.1 very carefully. This diagram
outlines the principal phenomena under study. The author believes that _f the
reader realizes the implications advanced in this schematic his grasp of the
intrinsic problems of P_D budgeting should be lucid.
Under the section entitled POP Submissions we see that each POP is
codified by using three numerals. These n_nbers, termed the designator, are
constructed in the following way. The first two digits represent the calendar
e_ while the digit positioned after the dash signifies the quarter in _¢hich
the POP was generated. Thusly, the 64-3 POP was produced in the third quarter
of 1964 while the 66-1 POP, being exemplified hereiu, _as formulated in the
first quarter of 1966. Figure 4.1 relates the exact month each MSC POP was
composed with a darkened block under the given month.
,-4
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However, the POP must evolve through several successive phases before
being finalized, and according the MSC POP generation period is followed by
a review, analysis, adjustment, and consolidation period (second month of each
quarter) at NASA Headquarters in the Office of Y_nned Space Flight. The deci-
sive pronouncement regarding the financial d_ta in a specific POP is termed
the Headquarter's "mark-up" and constitutes the plan MSC must live within for
the relevant quarter. This information will be forwarded to MSC in the "marked-
up" 0MSF MSF P_D POP which depicts the most recent quarter's officially
approved plans for the Manned Spacecraft Center, the George C. M_rshall Space
Flight Center, and the John F. Kennedy Space Center.
This phenomenon explains why the POP Submission entails only one month in
the schematic while the symbols signifying the generation of budget previews
and final estimates covers two months. For any internal budget plan used for
external purposes must receive fill concurrence from Headquarters. Only then
will the agency-wide budget display the consistency, rationality, and f_asi-
billty which are so vital. This also applies to XX-2 and XX-4 POP's which
are more for internal planning purposes.
Figure 4.1 additionally demonstrates the relationships existing between
the various POP's and other actions typical of the FBC. Inspection of the
diagram shows that all XX-1 POP inputs are used as substance from which the
preview estimates are created. 8 Moreover, the XX-3 POP's form the basic
inputs necessary to cast the final estimates.
The entire movement of the Federal Budgetary Cycle (excluding post-audit )
may be traced for FY 1966 and FY 1967 by following the respective symbols
As related in chapter 3_ the XX-2 POP also enters the picture as it pro-
vides the Administrator with the most recent financial re_ding before his con-
frontation with the Budget Bureau Director.
/!
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provided in figure 4.1. Once again, the reader should recognize the substantial
lead time associated with the preview estimate and the shorter, yet still nega-
tively significant lead time inherent in the final budget estimates.
Conclusion
Summarily, one should cite the POP as a fundamental element ingrained in
the FBC as practiced by NASA. Two principal missions which must be properly
effected in the FBC are substantially aided through the POP as related below.
First, the POP is the sole recurring interface between NASA Headquarters
and its many field centers. This is with respect to resource needs and pro-
gram substance.
Second, it affords the Agency a means of assigning relative priorities
among competing programs. This is very _mportant, as distinct programs are
planned and approved in a vacuum and therefore the total agency program effort
must be integrated, evaluated, and adjusted to reconcile agency resource con-
straints along with other contingencies of significance.
Basically, the author believes these two tasks are accomplished in excel-
lent fashion. The overall concept of the POP is very good 3 although some of
the inputs comprising it could be refined. The authors main concern lies in
the area of the POP's schedule structure and this will be taken up in chapter 6.
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Research and Development Budgetary Phenomena:
A Documentation
The author has made statements concerning the R&D budget formulation pro-
cess and how it relates to the FBC in the preceding chapters. However, there
has been little quantitative backup substantiating these phenomena thus far,
and yet this is a critical aspect which must be related if the author's allega-
tions are to assume any credence. Therefore, the ensuing chapter will set forth
to portray in a well documented fashion much of what has been asserted here-
tofore.
The writer's methodology will evolve in the subsequent manner. Initially,
a treatment of the MSC Gemini, Mercury, and Apollo program budgets will be ex-
tended to yield cognizance of their re latlve program magnitudes. Nex_ each of
these program's •spacecraft budgets will be analyzed in two contrasting lights:
(1) the project runout I obligational values over time; and, (2) for actual
and projected yearly obligational levels. Following this, an evaluation of
NASA's three most recent R_D budget submissions to the Congress will be made
•along with a similar coverage of MSC's Apollo Spacecraft budget development for
that period.
One additional factor should be stressed before proceeding on with the
analysis. The author will be interested in the graphical plots seen in fig-
ures _.l through _.8 from the standpoint of program dynamics and therefore
there will be no real concern for discrete fund values. The figures provided
_unout as used in this chapter designates the total monies necessa2_ to
complete a given program and may be equated to obligational authority.
p-
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should prove to be perspicuous instruments in discerning the issues under in-
vestigation.
MSC - A Program Overview
The reader's attention should now be directed toward figure 5.1. This
diagram extends an excellent perspective of MSC's proximal program scopes.
The author believes that a perusal of these program profiles will create a
genuine appreclation for the immensity of the program responsibilities MSC
has been charged with and will continue to hold.
The Manned Spacecraft Center did not reall_ r become operational until
FY 1962 - before this period it was designated the Space Task Group and was
located at the langley Research Center. Thus, we see from figure _.l that
most of the Mercury budget was embodied in the Space Task Group and actually
decreased when this cadre transferred to MSC as the Mercury program expanded
into essentially a production and flight operations effort.
Probably the most rational way to relate the tremendous differences in
these three program obligational levels is to examine the objectives thereof.
This will provide the reader with the necessary insight and yet ignore a relent-
less fiscal analysis of the programs as this is not the purpose of this paper
in the literal sense.
First, we see the Mercury Program as what may now appear to have been a
rather facile undertaking, but what at the time was unquestionably an arduous
and significant step forward in the conquest of space. Baslcall_, the Mercury
Program was designed to, and succeeded in, accomplishing three objectives:
(1) the earth orbiting of a manned spacecraft; (2) el_nentary scrutinization
of man's capability to perform and function while affected by a cosmic m_lieu;
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and logically, (3) successful recovery of the astronaut and his spaceship.
The program from inception to completion spanned approximately four and one-
half years.
Next_ we recognize the more_ ambitious Gemini Program which may be char-
acterized as a transitional program linking and integrating the evolving
American space effort. This called for expanding the Concepts and objectives
of the Mercury Program in a highly complex and sophisticated manner. In other
words# the capabilities realized in the Mercury Program were to be substantially
refined in an operational context so that they could eventually supply vital
inputs when desired in the Apollo Program. Therefore the prominent objectives
of the Gemini program were (are): (i) fourteen day duration flights; (2) ren-
dezvous; (3)docking; (_)extra-vehicular activity; (_)post-docklng ma:_euvers;
and (6) controlled reentry. The expected length of this program will be near
six years.
Finally 3 comes the awe inspiring Apollo Program. This will encoml_ss the
transportation of three astronauts to the moon in a spacecraft displaying per-
formance capabilities decidedly more advanced than those found in the Mercury
or Gemini Programs. Subsequently two astronauts will be ferried to the moon's
surface in a special spacecraft (the L_N) whereupon they will egress to explore
the lunar terrain. Finally, the LEM will blastoff from the moon's surfacej
rendezvous with the lunar ozbiting mother craft 3 and then the three ast_onauts
will return to the planet earth. The overall time required to complete this
program is nine years although the first lunar landing will be effected in
eight years.
The objectives of the three programs discussed above should clearS_¥ s_ssist
the reader in understanding the relative magnitudes of the respective obllgatlona
2
curves in figure 5.1. Yet, the preceding historical budget development as
represented in this graph does not approach the problem under study. This
information has been only extended for the reader's interest and also to
sharpen his overall perspective of MSC's gross role.
The remainder of this chapter will investigate the principal phenomenon
inherent in R&D budgeting - the constant upward fund requirements of given pro-
gram elements. In so doing, the author will use the spacecraft budgets ti_t
have come under STG-MSC jurisdiction.
This approach was adopted for several reasons. First, it affords the use
of a fairly unitary line item in each of the programs. Secondly, this t_chnique
furnishes the writer examples of typical MSC developmental responsibilities
which are exemplary of the R&D function.
Mercury Spacecraft Budget
Figure 5.2 represents the Mercury Spacecraft runout budget as it was pro-
Jected at discrete time intervals from FY 1960 to FY 1963. The reader should
also study figure 5.3 which will be correlated to the runout diagram.
The most obvious phenomenon portrayed in figure 5.2 is the constantly
increasing runout extrapolation for the Mercury Spacecraft until a plateau is
reached in the latter half of FY 1962. This assumes even more significance if
one analyzes the identical period on the yearly obligations schematic (fig. 5.3).
For the plateau effect is achieved only at a point where MSC obligations are
decreasing sharply. This occurrance signifies the Mercury Spacecraft was in
the production and early flight phases discussed earlier in chapter 2. It is
2The obligational levels for the Mercury and Gemini Programs include
booster procurement while that of Apollo does not.
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only at this time that major contingencies have been surmounted, program dei'ini-
tion and scope finalized, and realistic funding needs calculated.
However_ what are some of the fundamental reasons for this growth in run-
out value? Why did it temper off and stabilize so late in the spacecraft's
development? Frankly, there are numerous reasons - the author will relate
those which constitute substantial elements of this growth process.
The primary factor needing recognition here is the singularity characteriz-
ing this spacecraft's development. For until the terminal phases of the Mercury
Program were approached, unique R&D contingencies dominated the program and
thereby exerted unruly pressure upon performance and schedule parameters which
invariably affected cost in an adverse sense.
Much of the trouble may be traced to early design and developmental prob-
lems along with predicaments encountered in qualifications tests. Following
this phase of the Mercury Spacecraft's R&D evolution, the schedule was ex-
panded further by the existing management philosophy of flying manned sp_ce-
craft only when the near perfection of its myriad systems could be guaranteed -
therefore additional cost.
Another factor was the expanding scope and definition of the Mercury Space-
craft budget. For the original estimates of runout called for twelve space-
craft whereas twenty were ultimately procured. Moreover, four fiscal weighty
entities were added to the McDonnell Mercury Spacecraft budget before the run-
out plateau was attained. These were: (I) a spare parts program; (2) g_,ound
support equipment; (3) trainers ar_ associated equipment; _d, (4) the launch
support effort at Cape Kennedy. Quite naturalSj then, these factors accounted
for some of the runout growth.
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Finally there was work instituted in the program which had not originally
been programmed. For example, plans fluctuated from @ngineering a spacecraft
with a one day capability to a 3 orbit capability and back again to a one day
capability. Moreover, there was a fair amount of effort expendedtoward
realizing a three day capability which did not materialize.
The reader should rememberseveral factors which will be reinterated, re-
fined, and expatiated upon under the Gemini and Apollo spacecraft programs.
Oneis the obvious hazard inherent in budget formulation when runout budgets
possess the positive variance epitomized by the Mercury Spacecraft example.
Secondly, flow of the yearly obligational curve should be recollected for com-
parison to the more complex spacecraft budgets coming under discussion. For
an examination of these curves will relate phenomenaof central interest.
Gemini Spacecraft Budget
The analysis now shifts to the Gemini Spacecraft budget depicted in
figures 5.4 and 5.5 The configurations (not gross values) of these two
schematics bear similarity to those of the Mercury Spacecraft. However, the
substantive derivation of these profiles must be attributed to incidents some-
what different than those governing the Mercury effort.
Simple recall of the objectives delineated earlier for the Gemini Program
will help establish the reader's perception regarding the unique R&D challenge
in this undertaking over that experienced in the Mercury Spacecraft's develop-
ment. This is due to the vastly increased versatility and sophistication of
the Gemini Spacecraft which was achieved thr°ugh incorp°rating the foll_,'Ing
revolutionary subsystems: (1) fuel cells; (2) rendezvous radar; (3) an ".ner-
tial guidance system; (4) ejection seats; and, (5) onboard propulsion.
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Also, the Gemini Spacecraft had modulation of its systems for installa-
tion outside rather than inside the spacecraft. This made repair and replace-
ment actions easier, yet represented a new concept in spacecraft development.
An Adapter Module provided much of the necessary volume for the new long or-
bital duration systems - it marks one of the most distinguishing external dif-
ferences between the Mercury and Gemini Spacecraft. In other words, MSC and
the participating contractors did not leave the complex arena of advanced
Research and Development with the consummation of the Mercury Program, but
conversely this team confronted even more difficult problems as their aero-
space knowledgeability expanded.
The reader should note that the Gemini Spacecraft runout budget peaked at
approximately the same time its yearly obligational budget summit was reached.
Subsequently, as the spacecraft's funding requirements decreased and MSC en-
tered the production and flight operation phases of the program, diminutions
were realized in the runout budget. We shall explore the casual factors be-
hind this behavior pattern shortly.
The burgeoning runout budget may be attributed to two broad contingencies.
First and foremost, were the traditional, characteristic adversities associated
with the R&D function that were prevlousl_ advanced in chapter 2. For it was
during FY 1963 and much of FY 1964 that ma_ of the prime a_d sub-contractors
were encountering difficulties in their assigned development projects. Accord-
ingly, the requisite performance capabilities were not achieved and cost
harassment continued.
Moreover, schedule effects imputed additional cost amplifications to the
Gemini Spacecraft runout budget. For initially there were to be launche_ every
sixty days when manned flight operations began. However, in late FY 1963 this
4io6
was deemed impossible as a ninety day interval was adopted. The runout budget
received yet another incremental increase due to the related extension of the
Gemini Program by one year. Such a program elongation inflated all projected
obligational levels including those in the Gemini Spacecraft in a manner re-
lated in chapter 2.
Suddenly in FY 1964 two things occurred which in fact lowered the prog-
nosis on the spacecraft's runout budget. It is only unfortunate such windfalls,
if they may so be designated, do not occur with more frequency and consistency.
First and most important, the developmental enigmas were conquered and the
ultimate program definition was reached. Second, the major (prime) contractor
for the Gemini Spacecraft (McDonnell) was awarded a large fighter plane con-
tract. Both of these action's provided for greater efficiency and lower dost
on the spacecraft effort.
As the Gemini Program passed into the latter phases of production and mid-
phases of flight operations, a further reduction in predicted runout value is
seen. This is due to savings realized under the recently negotiated incentive
contract for the Gemini Spacecraft. 3
Once again, before perlustrating the Apollo Spacecraft budget, the writer
will reinterate several conspicuous facts whose significance _as also related
in the Mercury Spacecraft budget. First of course, are the dire connotations
advanced when budgeting under substantial variances in projected runout growth.
It should be mentioned that the problem is all the more serious because these
increased resource needs occur particularly while approaching the apex of the
3The reader should recognize that any cost reduction effected by the prime
contractor will extend to him a larger fee over direct cost when the contract
is on an incentive basis if schedule and technical performance criteria _re
obtained.
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yearly obligational bell curve. The tendency for thls resource summit to
expand vertically and horizontally will typically not be arrested until the
extrapolated runout curve peaks out at a stable plateau. This was the case in
the Mercury Spacecraft budget, the Gemini Spacecraft budget, and particularly
so, in the Apollo Spacecraft budget as we shall soon learn.
Such phenomena generate genuine problems for those responsible for budget
formulation. If an agency had but one program characterized by the bell
curve funding phenomenon, they could at least breathe easier while riding down
the final phases of the yearly obllgational curve. However, as is the case
with NASA_SC several significant programs are in progress, and each is at a
different point on the bell curve as the graphs provided herein show. Changing
program definition adds to this problem. Therefore, the pressures on MSC's
preview and final budget estimates are constant and formidable.
Before entering the final budget analysis_ several con_Itlons defining
the Apollo Spacecraft budget should be illuminated. Firstj the term "space-
craft" is somewhat different in thls program than in the previous two. Inclu-
sive of the Apollo Spacecraft are the following: (1) Command Module; (2) Ser-
vice Module; (3) Lunar Excursion Module; and, (4) Navigation and Guidance
• Equipment to mention the most important components. Thus, it comprises m_ny
more systems than were realized in either the Mercury or Gemini Spacecraft.
Yet, the writer's definition of "spacecraft" groups all of these modules and
other equipment together. For it is to be expected that the hardware e_uating
a spacecraft will encompass increasingly more items as space missions assume
greater complexity over the years.
/io8
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The ensuing analysis will be more incisively developed than was the ease
in the Mercury and Gemini Spacecraft budgets. The author will use the Apollo'
Spacecraft budget to epitomize the stark realities of advanced P_D budgeting
and MSC's relationship to the overall NASA budget will also be studied.
The reader should now examine figures _.6, _.7, and _.8 which are identi-
cal in format to the schematics presented earlier with one exception. Fig-
ure _.8 gives essentially a yearly obligational budget depiction, only it rep-
resents Apollo Spacecraft budgets as they were engendered at finite periods
of time.
Upon inspection of the Apollo Spacecraft runout budget, one is immediately
cognizant of an important fact. Namely 3 that runout is still rising -yet, the
writer believes that the upward variance has been exhausted and the approximate
summit plateau reached. For MSC is approaching the peak in its Apollo Space-
craft yearly obligational bell curve as related in figure 5.7. Therefore, the
data generated in the 66-1 POP may be Judged as sufficiently accurate projections
for the author's purposes.
First we will consider the runout curve. Comparison of it to the Mercury
and Gemini Spacecraft runout data will reveal that Apollo required approximately
twice as long to peak out. This situation is qt_ite understandable if one remem-
bers the contrasting scopes and objectives of the missions under discussion.
Another interesting feature of figure 5.6 is the "axte_ded S" confi_uratlon
it resembles. In other words, a relatively slow growth in runout predictions
for a year and a half followed by a quickj massive increase_ and subsequently
a languid accretion until arriving at ,_hat the author belitves is ne_.1_ the
total runout value.
..... ?,:!i
/
[
NASA-S-66-2628 MAR 22
0
L--
.=
!
-6
-0
f-
5
7000
6O0O
5000
4000
3OOO
I
2000
oT
FY 62
T T _.
FY 63 FY 64 FY 65 FY 66
3"
I-'
0
xO
Figure 5.6. - Projected Apollo spacecraft runouto_tigat.ions - MSC.
"7
NASA-S-66-2630 MAR 22
0
(#1
"6
o
1300
1200
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
MSC POP--_. /
/
Projected in 66-1
/
/
!/
/
\
\
//
f
FY 62 FY 63 FY 64 FY65 FY 66 FY 67 FY 68 FY 69 FY 70
0
Figure 5.7. - Apo(Io spacecraftyearly obligations- MSC.
iii
To what may we attribute the characteristics of the Apollo Spacecraft
runout curve? The succeeding discussion attempts to isolate the most notable
and significant factors which extend insight upon this question.
First, one must realize the tenor of the Apollo Program up through early
FY 196_. For the Command and Service Modules contract was not awarded until
December of 1961 -- just three months before the initial spacecraft runout ex-
trapolation was courageously postulated. Moreover, the other major spacecraft
contract (on the Lunar Excursion Module) was not let until December of 1962 -
nine months after the referred to projection was made. Considering the basic
nature of R&D programs of this magnitude and singularity, is it surprising
these early estimates were so low? This writer does not th_/_k sol
As figure 9.6 relates, the tremendous tt_nescence in predicted runout
occurs after about a year and a half. It was during this time that the major
contractors were engaged primarily in extensive design efforts. Even over this
period the MSC-contractor perception of the lunar venture improved as som_ of
the program's cryptic components were distilled away. Also, the program's
definition and scope were becoming increasingly broad at this time. Essentially
the MSC-contractor team was formulating a more knowledgeable definition of what
the Job entailed. Thusly, additional runout value was affixed the earlier
projections to yield a fair increase by early FY 1964.
Yet, it was not until advanced design problems and increased program de-
finition occurred that runout value displayed its malignant growth. It is
typically in this phase that tangible and serious R&D contingencies germinate.
These phenomena, if promptly recognized and candidly evaluated, can necessitate
gross reevaluations in runout value similar to the magnitude seen between
FY 196_ and FY 1969. Moreover, it was over this period that the post lunar
ll2
f-
landing effort was included in the Apollo Spacecraft budget which added measur-
ably to predicted runout value.
As the test phase matured and a more sophisticated overview of the Apollo
Spacecraft resource needs was formulated, we see runout value leveling off
throughout FY9s ) 1965 and 1966. The small growth in runout over this span
was essentially due to the inclusion of various experiments in the spacecraft's
budget. Now (FY 1966) we are commencing to fly unmanned SlX_cecraft and
relativel[ substantial increases in runout value are not foreseen.
Examination of the two yearly obligational curves will also advance our
understanding of the Apollo Spacecraft budget. Figure 5.8 is of particttlar
utility in emphasing much of what has expounded heretofore. Figure _.7 re-
lates exactly the same thing as the line marked 1/66 in figure 5.8. It was
plotted individually to provide a graph with may be compared with similar ones
constructed for the Mercury and Gemini Spacecraft.
Basically, figure 5.8 affords the identical information found in the run-
out schematic. However, in this case the data are plotted as projected yearly
obligational levels required to fund the project to runout. There are four
discrete plots made over time and they are so designated through a month/
calendar year code.
These data are a vivid portrayal of what the writer briefly mentioned
earlier in the chapter. Specifically, that advanced P_D budgets have an in-
herent propensity to expand their horizontal and vertical parameters over time
spans. In digesting this presentation the reader is reminded of the cond.ltions
governing the growth of runout as put forth earlier. These conditions apply
equally for figure 5.8. However, there are several other factors depicted in
this figure which warrant accentuation.
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First, we see that the incipient obligational estimates maintain their
integrity through FY 1964. Also, one can ascertain that the extrapolated obll-
gational levels all decrease at approximately the same rat____eafter peaking out.
Inspection of their slopes which range from -1.0 to -0.7 substantiates this
fact.
However, the critical phenomenon under scrutiny here is the inclination
of these obligational estimates to expand in their horizontal and vertical di-
mensions just as they are approaching the previous yearly obligational summit.
This dual magnification of the yearly obligational curve's apex will typically
occur during the phases of early testing, changing program definition, and
4
development.
The author will now make an effort to integrate the previous budget reve-
lations with the fundamental problem. It is only hoped that the antecedent
discussion sufficiently documented the peculiar R&D budget traits operative
in the aerospace field. The writer also expects the connotations of such fis-
cal behavior upon NASA/MSC budget formulation were assimilated at least _ar-
t ially by the reader. We shall study this next. '
NASA/MSC - The R&D Budget Dilemma
The author stated in chapter 3 that agency budgets are frequently subjected
to the "shrinking summit" phenomenon throughout the budget cycle. Figure 5.9
corrobrates this fact in hard figures. This diagram shows the total NASA R&D
requests submitted to Congress and the subsequent amounts of N0A appropriated
for FY(s) 1964, 1965, and 1966.
4While the plot codified at 1/66 was cast from data generated in January
1966, the reader should be cautioned that essentially the same configuration
existed as early as September 1964.
Unfortunately the schematic does not relate the preview and final esti-
mates put forth to the Budget Bureau, but if this was the case the differen-
tials for especially the last two FY(s) would be substantially greater. The
significant fact is the same in either case though - namely, that agency bud-
gets receive an undenyable dilution throughout the FBC. In fact, the most re-
cent NASA total budget (R&D; C of F; and, AO) for FY 1967 has evolved from a
preview estimate approximating 5.7 billion dollars down to a sum slightly in
excess of 5 billon dollars which was submitted to Congress.
While keeping these happenings in mind, the reader should look at fig-
ure 5.10. The data therein are indicatory of the principal R&D budget _nigmas
implied throughout this paper. Explicitly, that the preview and final budget
estimates in hard core R&D projects may not always be equated to the N0A
alloted a designated project.
Thus, we see that for each of the three F_(s ) neither the preview estl-
mate nor the final budget estimate for the Apollo Spacecraft was equal to the
NOA applied to the project. Furthermore, the only reason FY 1964 exhibits
such little variance is that Congress inflicted a burdensome cut on that year's
R&D budget as shown in figure 5.9.
The gross under-estimation of the preview and final estimates for FY 1965
may be rationalized in retrospect. For it was in I_ 1964 there was a Herculean
jump in the Apollo Spacecraft runout value, yet this occurred after the two
estimates had been rendered to the Budget Bureau. With the ensuing contingen-
cies there were two alternatives available to NASA_C: (1) operate in FY 196._
at the level programmed in the final estimate; or, (2) reprogram other money
into the Apollo Spacecraft Project. The latter course of action _s chosen so
that schedule slippage could be held to a minimum. Such action advances dubio
(
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implications toward the programs of less appeal that were in effect "robbed"
to maintain the momentt_n of the Apollo Spacecraft Project.
The development of the FT 1966 spacecraft budget shows substantial im-
provement over the case for FT 1965. The preview was a poor projection of
changing scope and contingency effects upon resource needs; but it had not been
fully affectedbythe reevaluated runout value. The final estimate was adjusted
accordingly and was not too far off them ark.
The primary phenomenon to be remembered from these data is that histori-
cally in substantial R_D efforts the preview and final estimates are not
accurate designations of resource needs. This is particularly true when in the
middle of a program and approaching or at the apex of the bell obligational
curve.
NASA is a dynamic agency which will continue to assume new and more am-
bitious programs as her existingprogramsbecome history. It is only natural
then to expect continuing problems of the gender related herein.
The writer believes modifications may be instituted both within NASA and
the Nation's FBC to alleviate some of these advanced R&D budget formulation
problems. The phenomena described in this treatise may not be attributed
any single factor - there are many. Some of the causal factors lie within
the Agency while others are definitely inherent in the budget process itself.
While solutions to such an esoteric system are most difficult to arrive at,
the subsequent and concluding chapter will be directed toward advanclnga
hypothesis on just how they might be effected.
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A Recommended Solution
Summar Z Analysis
The author's intensions here are not to initiate a complete restatement
of the preceding chapters, but rather afford the reader a recapitulation of
the principal phenomena and facts central to this dissertation. Such an over-
view is absolutely vital if the recommendations advanced in this chapter are
to be entirely appreciated.
We have learned that the schedule and procedural mechanics of the Federal
Budgetary Cycle imposes formidable constraints on the NASA_SC R&D budget for-
mulation process. This is partiall_v because the FBC's existing cyclical
structure demands long lead time resource projections from a dyuamic agency
whose intrinsic program characteristics are not in consonance with such a
schedule. Yet, some of the problem may also be traced to insufficient _g_mm
definition on NASA's part. In addition, the estimating abilities of NASA,
aerospace contractors, the Budget Bureau, and Congress may leave something to
be desired.
We learned in the preceding chapters that all of these factors upon st_ma-
tion create an atmosphere in which R&D runout value displays a ceaseless ten-
dency to increase until a project's operational phases are attained. Such a
phenomenon subjects agency statements on a given program's total cost to ques-
tions concerning their credibility. Yet, of greater significance is the effect
this has upon preview and final budget estimates. For as _s depicted in
chapter 5, the MBC spacecraft estimates in the Apollo Program have never equated
the NOA ultimately alloted the Center.
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Obviously, a modification in the procedures for funding P_Defforts would
seemadvisable. Yet, we must rememberthe methodology relied upon in the
allocation of these finite dollars is primarily dependent upon the American
political system and any adjustment of this process is a very delicate matter.
So the basic question then becomes, "Howmaywe improve R&Dbudgetary proce-
dures while accommodatingthe indigenous realities of the body politic."
NaturalS_ythis encompassesa scrutlnizatlon of internal as well as external
(to the agency) phenomena. It is to this enigma that the remainder of the
chapter is devoted.
Before yielding to such an effort_ one further point desires clarification.
Specifically, that the writer is concerned with synthesizing a more rational
substratum around which the substantive R&Dbudget issues maybe resolved.
This does not imply any indictment of political decision making in budgetary
affairs -- the NOAany agency is destined to receive is assuredly a political
judgement and this is the way it should be under our system. The author is
simply recommendingways in which all involved parties may operate more
efficiently and rationally.
The Supplemental Appropriation
Essentially the author is searching for viable procedures which will lend
more flexibility to the NASA_SC RAD budget formulation process. Yet, I_efore
advancing any recommendations, the writer will briefly discuss a budgetary tool
which is not fully understood by the general public - the supplemental appro-
priation.
Broadly speaking, the supplemental appropriation is structured to accommo-
date off-cycle occurrances of relative importance. For example, the majority
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of all supplemental appropriations are enacted to provide the moneynecessary
in meeting additional agency obligations incurred through recent legislation
finalized after said agencies' appropriation bill has been passed. This usu-
ally entails pay raise bills and newprogram legislation which display urgent
funding needs. Supplemental appropriations will prove of most utility to
agencies who have traditionally possessed trivial funding flexibility.
However, NASA'sannual R&Dappropriation is of enormous size, under no
obligational time limit, and marked by specific transfer capabilities at the
Headquarters level. In all candor then, the supplemental appropriation is a
poor tool for yielding program flexibility to NASA's P_D effort. As we shall
learn there are several reasons for this.
First 3 a supplemental appropriation must be of massive proportions to
really solve NASA's fiscal program adversities. Due to the flexibility men-
tioned above, NASA can usually meet contingencies approaching _0 million dol-
lars, and therefore a supplemental appropriation should conservatively approxi-
mate at least 100 million dollars to be Justified. Such monies are most diffi-
cult to obtain for two reasons: (1) the President must give full concurrence;
and, (2) the "tight fisted" members of the Suppl_nental Appropriations Sub-
committee must support the request.
Even aside from political roadblocks, there exist other procedural and
legal constraints which are in effect the primary factors limiting the flexi-
bility of supplemental appropriations in complex R_D projects. For example,
consider what would happen if a crisis developed in the Apollo Program in
November of a FY and approximately 100 million dollars is needed soon if
serious schedule lags are to be averted. In such a case, the probability is
near unity that serious schedule lags would actually develop.
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This is because the earliest possible date this gender of legislation
could become law is May of the given FY - regardless of the political climate.
In the meantime, NASA must operate at the previously prograsxned levels for
the Apollo Program. To do otherwise would expose the official responsible
for authorizing Apollo Program funds to a most ominous plight.
For example, if he were to authorize operating centers increased obliga-
tional parameters to the supplemental appropriation being sought, the program
contingency could very likely be met. This would be absur_ in all reality
though - for if the NASA request was either cut or totally negated, this
individual would be in a very serious predicament. The Anti-Deficiency Act
lucidly defines the rewards for such unsurpations of authority as rangi_E from
a substantial fine to/or including a prison sentence.
Understandably thenj a "bird in the hand" is the only type that counts and
similarly so for supplemental appropriations. NASA cannot assume additional
program funds will be allowed via the supplemental appropriation until these
monies have been legally consigned to the agency. This usually occurs late
in the FY at which time irreparable program damage has resulted.
It should be clear that the supplemental appropriation is not a reslistic
construct for meeting NASA's dynamic program responsibilities. The wri_sr will
now attempt to find at least a partial solution to this quantity.
Recommendations
As we have learned, the development of the NASA_C R&Obudget encompasses
several distinct levels of the bureaucracy. Consequently, the writer will
scrutinize areas of significance and subsequently suggest changes where the
123
probability for implementation is promising. This necessitates both internal
and external alterations in relation to NASA - the latter will be pursued first.
External Modifications
First, the author sincerely hopes unanimity may be soon realized in pro-
gram budgeting. The initial step has been taken by the Executive Branch and
thus this plea is directed more toward the Legislative Branch. The work re-
quired to attain program budgeting in both branches will represent a most
strenuous effort, yet the author believes this new orientation in budgeting
would go a long way in overcoming the fundamental problems in the P_D function.
In conjunction with the emphasis on program budgeting, there would al-
most have to be augmentations to the Budget Bureau and substantive Congressional
committee staffs. This should not be taken as an indication that program bud-
geting necessitates more work on all participating parties, but rather tY_t
both of these impressive institutions are presently understaffed. Moreover,
the National budget is with each passing day becoming more esoteric and
complicated - the writer sees no curtailment of this growth in the near future.
However, the author's primary concern is for suggesting a tool which will
provide the R_D function with the flexibility so essential for its efficient
management. In so doing, the writer will be concerned with postulating a
viable medium which in addition to being operationally feasible will also be
politically acceptable. For regardless of the merits any plan may advance,
it must realistically display congruence to our system of gover_nent and there-
by stand a chance for implementation before it can garner any substantive
support.
The principal recommendation advanced herein is not controversial or a
threat to existing procedures and mores relating to the budgetary process. In
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fact, it is a budget instrument analogous to that enjoyed by the Department
of Defense.
Specifically, the author strongly recommends establishing a Research and
Development Contingency Fund (RADCF) for the National Aeronautics an_ Space
Administration. The nature and purpose of this fund will be as follows_
First, the monies available under RADCF will be used to confront serious
R&D contingencies in any given FY. Implicit in the use of _ monies is the
fact that they would be relied upon only under conditions similar to those
justifying a supplemental appropriation request. In other words 3 there would
have to be determined administrative restraint in drawing upon these funds.
For the continued success of this new NASA R&D budget technique without ques-
tion will depend on the initial and continuing support of the Congress.
RADCF would also assist NASA in funding programs which would otherwise be
adversely affected by periods of "Continuing Resolution." For example, _ro-
grams which call for increasing obligational levels in a new FY will suffer
under the present "Continuing Resolution" funding methods, however, under
the author's proposal these difficulties could be overcome until the monies
for that FY are ultimately apportioned. Such an arrangement would also rein-
force Congressional desire to appropriate NASA monies by the inception of
each FY.
The NASA Administrator would, have plenary control over these funds and
concurrence from Congress regarding their use should not be required. Of
course, the Administrator would report to the A_proprintlons Cc_mlttees of
the Congress on a trl-yearly basis regarding the status of RADCF for the
current year. Annual reviev of these monies would be a part of the regular
Legislative Authorization and Appropriation phase of the FBC.
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The proximal magnitude of RADCF should be i_0 million dollars and once
enacted these funds would be apportioned through the Budget Bureau on a basis
of need. Assuming Congress endorses the employment of the monies (if they are
used at all), the fund would be replenished to the 150 million dollar level
each year.
Finally, the author would endorse using the same language found in the
authorization and appropriation acts for FY 1966. Therefore, all the provisions
detailed in chapter 3 would be maintained. However, one must remember this
action is recommended only if the Research and Development Contingency Fund be-
comes incorporated into the authorization and appropriation legislation.
Internal _difications
The writer truly believes that all parties concerned would realize _ub-
stantial benefits if the preceding recommendations are instituted. HoweSer,
all R&D budget problems are not attributable to the inherent characteristics
of the FBC and its schedule constraints. NASA also is plagued by genuine
obstacles within Its own organization.
Two of these are closely related and intrinsically a part of the R&D func-
tion. First, as stated repeatedly in the antecedent chapters, is the fact that
from the time a program begins until much of it has been accomplished, its de-
finition and scope are continually evolving. As program substance changes so
do the estimates equating cost in the program. Thls affects the second factor -
a poor estimating capability. It should be clear that until NASA_C de_ises
some means for establishing specific knowledge of exactly what a program in-
compasses, and does so early in the program, its estimating capability will be
less than desirable.
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This remark is also apropos for the Budget Bureau and the Cor_ress -
particularly as concerning initial actions taken by them authorizing long
range programs. An authentic adoption of program budgeting should partially
alleviate the problem. Remember this implies a concerted analysis of futuristic
needs versus simply trying to work around current year difficulties.
Therefore, NASA_SC must improve the accuracy of its long duration defini-
tions, and accordingly its ability to estimate resource needs. This is an
arduous task - the author is relatively unknowledgeable in this area and he
will not hazard postulating suggestions here. In all fairness, it should be
mentioned that the problem is receiving constant attention and undoubtedly
progress will be made in this area as the Agency continues to mature.
The author believes one additional change will better facilitate the
NASA budget formulation process. This action would require deleting one of
the quarterly POP's. The writer thinks four POP compilations per year sub-
jects the organization to an unnessary strain. Considering NASA's existing
internal reporting and planning system, the agency could easily meet its
myriad data requirements even while adhering to a _ri-annual POP submission
rate. The author suggests the following schedule be implemented.
Beginning in July at the field centers, the first POP for the new FY
would be generated and forwarded to Headquarters for the August "mark-up_ U
This document will function as the financial operating plan for the currant
FY. Accordingly, it would designate the Programmed rate for line item obliga-
tions pursuant to the appropriations recently enacted. Or, if the current
H legislation was still pending, the July-August POP would relate the extent
to which RADCF monies are to be applied on programs demanding higher obliga-
tlonal levels than was the case in the preceding FT. The July-August PCP would
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also be used for formulating the Agencies' final budget estimates. Therefore,
the initial POP generated over the July-August span of each new FY would be a
very important submission.
The next POP would be produced in November and December. Essentially it
would represent a status check on all line items and relate any changes in the
present FY's plan. Moreover, it would prove valuable in evaluating any sig-
nificant variances over the previous POP which might have a considerable bear-
ing on the final budget if this is deemed advisable.
Finally, in May and April the last POP for the FY would be formed. Inclu-
sive in this generation are the Agencies' preview estimates. Moreover, the
plans for reprogramming and year end adjustments would be designated in this
document.
Conclusion
Of course, all recommendations advanced in this chapter are highly depen-
dent upon one-another. Summarily, we see the following suggestions have been
made:
(i) A stronger emphasis upon a program budget orientation - especially
in the Congress;
(2) Augmentation of Budget Bureau and substantive committees in the
Congress;
(3) Implementation of a Research and Development Contingency Fund;
(4) Better definition of program substance and correspondingly improved
predicting capabilities; and,
(5) The use of three POP's per year versus the existing four per year.
The author is adamant in his conviction that these postulations if effected
will be very instrumental in Achieving several significant improvements in the
NASA Research and Development budget formulation process. These are:
SELECTEDBIBLIOGRAPHY
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(i) The degree of flexibility necessary in aerospace R&D programs;
(2) Better definition and predictive capabilities both withln NASA and
externally, hence;
(3) Greater efficiency in the space program;
(4) A better understanding of aerospace R&D management problems and the
subsequent realization of more sophisticated solutions thereof;
(5) Increased rapport and confidence between the Executive and Legislative
Branches on R&D matters; and,
(6) Ultimately a more optimal allocation of scarce National resources.
In the writer's estimation all of these things are within our grasp if the
recommendations related herein are implemented.
It should be emphasized that all of the author's suggestions could realis-
tically be operationalized without even a slight upheaval of the existing bud-
getary system. They are primarily procedural changes, although s_Lmittedly
true program budgeting will be the most revolutionary and the hardest to embody
throughout the system. Yet, the writer unequivocally believes NASA, the Budget
Bureau, the Congress, and all other involved parties are equal to the task_
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